Understanding Security Policy Regulations And Standards

Business policies are the guidelines that are developed by an organization to govern its actions. The policies define standards of correct behaviour for the business and its employees. In networking, policies define the activities that are allowed on the network.

This sets a baseline of acceptable use. If the behaviour that violates the business policy is detected on the network, it is possible that a security breach has occurred. understanding Security Policy Regulations And Standards. In this article, I want to talk about security policy regulations and standards in cyber security.

An organization may have several guiding policies, as listed in the table.

Policy	Description
Company policies	These policies establish the rules of conduct and the responsibilities of both employees and employers. Policies protect the rights of workers as well as the business interests of employers. Depending on the needs of the organization, various policies and procedures establish rules regarding employee conduct, attendance, dress code, privacy and other areas related to the terms and conditions of employment.
Employee policies	These policies are created and maintained by human resources staff to identify employee salary, pay schedule, employee benefits, work schedule, vacations, and more. They are often provided to new employees to review and sign.
Security policies	These policies identify a set of security objectives for a company, define the rules of behavior for users and administrators, and specify system requirements. These objectives, rules, and requirements collectively ensure the security of a network and the computer systems in an organization. Much like a continuity plan, a security policy is a constantly evolving document based on changes in the threat landscape, vulnerabilities, and business and employee requirements.

Security Policy

A comprehensive security policy has a number of benefits, including the following:

Demonstrates an organization’s commitment to security
Sets the rules for expected behavior
Ensures consistency in system operations, software and hardware acquisition and use, and maintenance
Defines the legal consequences of violations
Gives security staff the backing of management

Security policies are used to inform users, staff, and managers of an organization’s requirements for protecting technology and information assets. A security policy also specifies the mechanisms that are needed to meet security requirements and provides a baseline from which to acquire, configure, and audit computer systems and networks for compliance.

The table lists policies that may be included in a security policy.

Policy	Description
Identification and authentication policy	Specifies authorized persons that can have access to network resources and identity verification procedures.
Password policies	Ensures passwords meet minimum requirements and are changed regularly.
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)	Identifies network applications and uses that are acceptable to the organization. It may also identify ramifications if this policy is violated.
Remote access policy	Identifies how remote users can access a network and what is accessible via remote connectivity.
Network maintenance policy	Specifies network device operating systems and end user application update procedures.
Incident handling procedures	Describes how security incidents are handled.

One of the most common security policy components is an AUP. This can also be referred to as an appropriate use policy. This component defines what users are allowed and not allowed to do on the various system components. This includes the type of traffic that is allowed on the network. The AUP should be as explicit as possible to avoid misunderstanding.

For example, an AUP might list specific websites, newsgroups, or bandwidth-intensive applications that are prohibited from being accessed by company computers or from the company network. Every employee should be required to sign an AUP, and the signed AUPs should be retained for the duration of employment.

BYOD Policies

Many organizations must now also support Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). This enables employees to use their own mobile devices to access company systems, software, networks, or information. BYOD provides several key benefits to enterprises, including increased productivity, reduced IT and operating costs, better mobility for employees, and greater appeal when it comes to hiring and retaining employees.

However, these benefits also bring an increased information security risk because BYOD can lead to data breaches and greater liability for the organization.
A BYOD security policy should be developed to accomplish the following:

Specify the goals of the BYOD program.
Identify which employees can bring their own devices.
Identify which devices will be supported.
Identify the level of access employees are granted when using personal devices.
Describe the rights to access and activities permitted to security personnel on the device.
Identify which regulations must be adhered to when using employee devices.
Identify safeguards to put in place if a device is compromised.

The table lists BYOD security best practices to help mitigate BYOD vulnerabilities.

Best Practice	Description
Password-protected access	Use unique passwords for each device and account.
Manually control wireless connectivity	Turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connectivity when not in use. Connect only to trusted networks.
Keep updated	Always keep the device OS and other software updated. Updated software often contains security patches to mitigate against the latest threats or exploits.
Back up data	Enable backup of the device in case it is lost or stolen.
Enable “Find my Device”	Subscribe to a device locator service with a remote wipe feature.
Provide antivirus software	Provide antivirus software for approved BYOD devices.
Use Mobile Device Management (MDM) software	MDM software enables IT, teams, to implement security settings and software configurations on all devices that connect to company networks.

Regulatory and Standards Compliance

There are also external regulations regarding network security. Network security professionals must be familiar with the laws and codes of ethics that are binding on Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) professionals.

Many organizations are mandated to develop and implement security policies. Compliance regulations define what organizations are responsible for providing and the liability if they fail to comply. The compliance regulations that an organization is obligated to follow depend on the type of organization and the data that the organization handles. Specific compliance regulations will be discussed later in the course.

Action Point
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I know you might agree with some of the points that I have raised in this article. You might not agree with some of the issues raised. Let me know your views about the topic discussed. We will appreciate it if you can drop your comment. Thanks in anticipation.

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Understanding CIA Triad In Cyber Security

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Information security deals with protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. In this article, I will be talking about CIA Triad in cyber security. Follow me as we are going to look at that together in this article.

CIA Triad

As shown in the figure, the CIA triad consists of three components of information security:

Confidentiality – Only authorized individuals, entities, or processes can access sensitive information.
Integrity – This refers to the protection of data from unauthorized alteration.
Availability – Authorized users must have uninterrupted access to the network resources and data that they require.

Network data can be encrypted (made unreadable to unauthorized users) using various cryptography applications. The conversation between two IP phone users can be encrypted. The files on a computer can also be encrypted. These are just a few examples. Cryptography can be used almost anywhere that there is data communication. In fact, the trend is toward all communication being encrypted.

Zero Trust Security

Zero trust is a comprehensive approach to securing all access across networks, applications, and environments. This approach helps secure access from users, end-user devices, APIs, IoT, microservices, containers, and more. It protects an organization’s workforce, workloads, and workplace.

The principle of a zero-trust approach is, “never trust, always verify.” Assume zero trusts any time someone or something requests access to assets. A zero-trust security framework helps to prevent unauthorized access, contain breaches, and reduce the risk of an attacker’s lateral movement through a network.

Traditionally, the network perimeter, or edge, was the boundary between inside and outside, or trusted and untrusted. In a Zero trust approach, any place at which an access control decision is required should be considered a perimeter.

This means that although a user or other entity may have successfully passed access control previously, they are not trusted to access another area or resource until they are authenticated. In some cases, users may be required to authenticate multiple times and in different ways, to gain access to different layers of the network.

The three pillars of zero trust are workforce, workloads, and workplace.
Click on the buttons to learn more about the pillars of zero trust.

Zero Trust for the Workforce

Zero Trust for Workloads

Zero Trust for the Workplace

#1 Zero Trust for the Workforce

This pillar consists of people (e.g., employees, contractors, partners, and vendors) who access work applications by using their personal or corporate-managed devices. This pillar ensures only the right users and secure devices can access applications, regardless of location.

#2 Zero Trust for Workloads

#3 Zero Trust for Workplace

This pillar focuses on secure access for any and all devices, including on the internet of things (IoT), that connect to enterprise networks, such as user endpoints, physical and virtual servers, printers, cameras, HVAC systems, kiosks, infusion pumps, industrial control systems, and more.

Access Control Models

An organization must implement proper access controls to protect its network resources, information system resources, and information.
A security analyst should understand the different basic access control models to have a better understanding of how attackers can break the access controls.
The table lists various types of access control methods.

Access Control Models	Description
Discretionary access control (DAC)	This is the least restrictive model and allows users to control access to their data as owners of that data. DAC may use ACLs or other methods to specify which users or groups of users have access to the information.
Mandatory access control (MAC)	This applies the strictest access control and is typically used in military or mission critical applications. It assigns security level labels to information and enables users with access based on their security level clearance.
Role-based access control (RBAC)	Access decisions are based on an individual’s roles and responsibilities within the organization. Different roles are assigned security privileges, and individuals are assigned to the RBAC profile for the role. Roles may include different positions, job classifications or groups of job classifications. Also known as a type of non-discretionary access control.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC)	ABAC allows access based on attributes of the object (resource) to be accessed, the subject (user) accessing the resource, and environmental factors regarding how the object is to be accessed, such as time of day.
Rule-based access control (RBAC)	Network security staff specify sets of rules regarding or conditions that are associated with access to data or systems. These rules may specify permitted or denied IP addresses, or certain protocols and other conditions. Also known as Rule-Based RBAC.
Time-based access control (TAC)	TAC Allows access to network resources based on time and day.

Another access control model is the principle of least privilege, which specifies a limited, as-needed approach to granting user and process access rights to specific information and tools. The principle of least privilege states that users should be granted the minimum amount of access required to perform their work function.

A common exploit is known as privilege escalation. In this exploit, vulnerabilities in servers or access control systems are exploited to grant an unauthorized user, or software process, higher levels of privilege than they should have. After the privilege is granted, the threat actor can access sensitive information or take control of a system.

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Understanding AAA Operation In Cyber Security

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Understanding AAA Operation In Cyber Security

A network must be designed to control who is allowed to connect to it and what they are allowed to do when they are connected. These design requirements are identified in the network security policy. The policy specifies how network administrators, corporate users, remote users, business partners, and clients access network resources. The network security policy can also mandate the implementation of an accounting system that tracks who logged in and when and what they did while logged in. Some compliance regulations may specify that access must be logged and the logs retained for a set period of time

The Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocol provides the necessary framework to enable scalable access security.

The table lists the three independent security functions provided by the AAA architectural framework.

AAA Component	Description
Authentication	Users and administrators must prove that they are who they say they are. Authentication can be established using a username and password combinations, challenge and response questions, token cards, and other methods. AAA authentication provides a centralized way to control access to the network.
Authorization	After the user is authenticated, authorization services determine which resources the user can access and which operations the user is allowed to perform. An example is “User ‘student’ can access host server XYZ using SSH only.”
Accounting	Accounting records what the user does, including what is accessed, the amount of time the resource is accessed, and any changes that were made. Accounting keeps track of how network resources are used. An example is “User ‘student’ accessed host server XYZ using SSH for 15 minutes.”

This concept is similar to the use of a credit card, as indicated by the figure. The credit card identifies who can use it, how much that user can spend, and keeps an account of what items the user spent money on.

AAA Authentication

AAA Authentication can be used to authenticate users for administrative access or it can be used to authenticate users for remote network access.
Cisco provides two common methods of implementing AAA services.

Local AAA Authentication

Server-Based AAA Authentication

This method is sometimes known as self-contained authentication because it authenticates users against locally stored usernames and passwords, as shown in the figure. Local AAA is ideal for small networks.

Centralized AAA is more scalable and manageable than local AAA authentication and therefore, it is the preferred AAA implementation.

A centralized AAA system may independently maintain databases for authentication, authorization, and accounting. It can leverage Active Directory or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for user authentication and group membership while maintaining its own authorization and accounting databases.

Devices communicate with the centralized AAA server using either the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) or Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS+) protocols.

The table lists the differences between the two protocols.

	TACACS+	RADIUS
Functionality	It separates authentication, authorization, and accounting functions according to the AAA architecture. This allows modularity of the security server implementation.	It combines authentication and authorization but separates accounting, which allows less flexibility in implementation than TACACS+
Standard	Mostly Cisco supported	Open/RFC standard
Transport	TCP port 49	UDP ports 1812 and 1813, or 1645 and 1646
Protocol CHAP	Bidirectional challenge and response as used in Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)	Unidirectional challenge and response from the RADIUS security server to the RADIUS client
Confidentiality	Encrypts the entire body of the packet but leaves a standard TACACS+ header.	Encrypts only the password in the access-request packet from the client to the server. The remainder of the packet is unencrypted, leaving the username, authorized services, and accounting unprotected.
Customization	Provides authorization of router commands on a per-user or per-group basis	Has no option to authorize router commands on a per-user or per-group basis
Accounting	Limited	Extensive

AAA Accounting Logs

Centralized AAA also enables the use of the Accounting method. Accounting records from all devices are sent to centralized repositories, which simplifies auditing of user actions.

AAA Accounting collects and reports usage data in AAA logs. These logs are useful for security auditing. The collected data might include the start and stop connection times, executed commands, number of packets, and number of bytes.

One widely deployed use of accounting is to combine it with AAA authentication. This helps with managing access to internetworking devices by network administrative staff. Accounting provides more security than just authentication.

The AAA servers keep a detailed log of exactly what the authenticated user does on the device, as shown in the figure. This includes all EXEC and configuration commands issued by the user.

The log contains numerous data fields, including the username, the date and time, and the actual command that was entered by the user. This information is useful when troubleshooting devices. It also provides evidence against individuals who perform malicious actions.

The table displays the various types of accounting information that can be collected.

Type of Accounting Information	Description
Network Accounting	Network accounting captures information for all Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) sessions, including packet and byte counts.
Connection Accounting	Connection accounting captures information about all outbound connections that are made from the AAA client, such as by SSH.
EXEC Accounting	EXEC accounting captures information about user EXEC terminal sessions (user shells) on the network access server, including username, date, start and stop times, and the access server IP address.
System Accounting	System accounting captures information about all system-level events (for example, when the system reboots or when accounting is turned on or off).
Command Accounting	Command accounting captures information about the EXEC shell commands for a specified privilege level, as well as the date and time each command was executed, and the user who executed it.
Resource Accounting	The Cisco implementation of AAA accounting captures “start” and “stop” record support for connections that have passed user authentication. The additional feature of generating “stop” records for connections that fail to authenticate as part of user authentication is also supported. Such records are necessary for users employing accounting records to manage and monitor their networks.

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Securing Communications In Cyber Security: How ?

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Organizations must provide support to secure the data as it travels across links. This may include internal traffic, but it is even more important to protect the data that travels outside of the organization to branch sites, telecommuter sites, and partner sites. In this article, I want to take about the means of securing communications in cyber security. Follow me as we look at that in this article.
These are the four elements of secure communications:

Data Integrity – Guarantees that the message was not altered. Any changes to data in transit will be detected. Integrity is ensured by implementing either of the Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA-2 or SHA-3). The MD5 message-digest algorithm is still widely in use, however, it is inherently insecure and creates vulnerabilities in a network. The use of MD5 should be avoided.
Origin Authentication – Guarantees that the message is not a forgery and does actually come from whom it states. Many modern networks ensure authentication with algorithms such as hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).
Data Confidentiality – Guarantees that only authorized users can read the message. If the message is intercepted, it cannot be deciphered within a reasonable amount of time. Data confidentiality is implemented using symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms.
Data Non-Repudiation – Guarantees that the sender cannot repudiate, or refute, the validity of a message sent. Nonrepudiation relies on the fact that only the sender has the unique characteristics or signature for how that message is treated.

Cryptography can be used almost anywhere that there is data communication. In fact, the trend is toward all communication being encrypted.

Cryptographic Hash Functions

Hashes are used to verify and ensure data integrity. Hashing is based on a one-way mathematical function that is relatively easy to compute, but significantly harder to reverse. Grinding coffee is a good analogy of a one-way function.

It is easy to grind coffee beans, but it is almost impossible to put all of the tiny pieces back together to rebuild the original beans. The cryptographic hashing function can also be used to verify authentication.

A hash function takes a variable block of binary data, called the message, and produces a fixed-length, condensed representation, called the hash. The resulting hash is also sometimes called the message digest, digest, or digital fingerprint.

With hash functions, it is computationally infeasible for two different sets of data to come up with the same hash output. Every time the data is changed or altered, the hash value also changes.

Because of this, cryptographic hash values are often called digital fingerprints. They can be used to detect duplicate data files, file version changes, and similar applications. These values are used to guard against an accidental or intentional change to the data, or accidental data corruption.

The cryptographic hash function is applied in many different situations for entity authentication, data integrity, and data authenticity purposes.

Cryptographic Hash Operation

Mathematically, the equation h= H(x) is used to explain how a hash algorithm operates. As shown in the figure, a hash function H takes an input x and returns a fixed-size string hash value h.

The example in the figure summarizes the mathematical process. A cryptographic hash function should have the following properties:

The input can be any length.
The output has a fixed length.
H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x.
H(x) is one way and not reversible.
H(x) is collision-free, meaning that two different input values will result in different hash values.

If a hash function is hard to invert, it is considered a one-way hash. Hard to invert means that given a hash value of h, it is computationally infeasible to find an input for x such that h=H(x).

MD5 and SHA

Hash functions are used to ensure the integrity of a message. They ensure data has not changed accidentally or intentionally. In the figure, the sender is sending a $100 money transfer to Alex. The sender wants to ensure that the message is not accidentally altered on its way to the receiver. Deliberate changes that are made by a threat actor are still possible.

Pay to Alex$100.00One Hundred and 00/100 Dollars4ehlDx67NMop9Starting HashPay to Jeremy$1000.00One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars12ehqPx67NMoXEnding HashDifferent

The hash algorithm works as follows:

The sending device inputs the message into a hashing algorithm and computes its fixed-length hash of 4ehiDx67NMop9.
This hash is then attached to the message and sent to the receiver. Both the message and the hash are in plaintext.
The receiving device removes the hash from the message and inputs the message into the same hashing algorithm. If the computed hash is equal to the one that is attached to the message, the message has not been altered during transit. If the hashes are not equal, as shown in the figure, then the integrity of the message can no longer be trusted.

There are four well-known hash functions:

MD5 with 128-bit digest – Developed by Ron Rivest and used in a variety of internet applications, MD5 is a one-way function that produces a 128-bit hashed message. MD5 is considered to be a legacy algorithm and should be avoided and used only when no better alternatives are available. It is recommended that SHA-2 or SHA-3 be used instead.
SHA-1 – Developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in 1995. It is very similar to the MD5 hash functions. Several versions exist. SHA-1 creates a 160-bit hashed message and is slightly slower than MD5. SHA-1 has known flaws and is a legacy algorithm.
SHA-2 – Developed by the NSA. It includes SHA-224 (224 bit), SHA-256 (256 bit), SHA-384 (384 bit), and SHA-512 (512 bit). If you are using SHA-2, then the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms should be used whenever possible.
SHA-3 – SHA-3 is the newest hashing algorithm and was introduced by NIST as an alternative and eventual replacement for the SHA-2 family of hashing algorithms. SHA-3 includes SHA3-224 (224 bit), SHA3-256 (256 bit), SHA3-384 (384 bit), and SHA3-512 (512 bit). The SHA-3 family are next-generation algorithms and should be used whenever possible.

While hashing can be used to detect accidental changes, it cannot be used to guard against deliberate changes that are made by a threat actor. There is no unique identifying information from the sender in the hashing procedure. This means that anyone can compute a hash for any data, as long as they have the correct hash function.

For example, when the message traverses the network, a potential attacker could intercept the message, change it, recalculate the hash, and append it to the message. The receiving device will only validate against whatever hash is appended.

Therefore, hashing is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and does not provide security to transmitted data. To provide integrity and origin authentication, something more is required.

Note: Hashing algorithms only protect against accidental changes and does not protect the data from changes deliberately made by a threat actor.

Origin Authentication

To add origin authentication and integrity assurance, use a keyed hash message authentication code (HMAC). HMAC uses an additional secret key as input to the hash function.

Note: Other Message Authentication Code (MAC) methods are also used. However, HMAC is used in many systems including SSL, IPsec, and SSH.

Click each button for an illustration and explanation about origin authentication using HMAC.

HMAC Hashing Algorithm

Creating the HMAC Value

Verifying the HMAC Value

Cisco Router HMAC Example

An HMAC is calculated using any cryptographic algorithm that combines a cryptographic hash function with a secret key. Hash functions are the basis of the protection mechanism of HMACs.

Only the sender and the receiver know the secret key, and the output of the hash function now depends on the input data and the secret key. Only parties who have access to that secret key can compute the digest of an HMAC function. This defeats man-in-the-middle attacks and provides authentication of the data origin.

If two parties share a secret key and use HMAC functions for authentication, a properly constructed HMAC digest of a message that a party has received indicates that the other party was the originator of the message. This is because the other party possesses the secret key.

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Data Confidentiality In Cybersecurity: What You Should Know

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There are two classes of encryption used to provide data confidentiality; asymmetric and symmetric. These two classes differ in how they use keys. In this article, I am going to talk about data confidentiality in Cybersecurity. Symmetric encryption algorithms such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), 3DES, and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are based on the premise that each communicating party knows the pre-shared key. Data confidentiality can also be ensured using asymmetric algorithms, including Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) and the public key infrastructure (PKI).

Note: DES is a legacy algorithm and should not be used. 3DES should be avoided if possible.
The figure highlights some differences between symmetric and asymmetric encryption.

Symmetric EncryptionAsymmetric Encryption

Use the same key to encrypt and decrypt data.
Key lengths are short (40 bits – 256 bits).
Faster than asymmetric encryption.
Commonly used for encrypting bulk data such as in VPN traffic.

Uses different keys to encrypt and decrypt data.
Key lengths are long (512 bits – 4096 bits).
Computationally taxing therefore slower than symmetric encryption.
Commonly used for quick data transactions such as HTTPS when accessing your bank data.

Symmetric Encryption

Symmetric algorithms use the same pre-shared key to encrypt and decrypt data. A pre-shared key, also called a secret key, is known by the sender and receiver before any encrypted communications can take place.

To help illustrate how symmetric encryption works, consider an example where Alice and Bob live in different locations and want to exchange secret messages with one another through the mail system. In this example, Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob.

In the figure, Alice and Bob have identical keys to a single padlock. These keys were exchanged prior to sending any secret messages. Alice writes a secret message and puts it in a small box that she locks using the padlock with her key. She mails the box to Bob.

The message is safely locked inside the box as the box makes its way through the post office system. When Bob receives the box, he uses his key to unlock the padlock and retrieve the message. Bob can use the same box and padlock to send a secret reply back to Alice.

Symmetric Encryption Example

Today, symmetric encryption algorithms are commonly used with VPN traffic. This is because symmetric algorithms use less CPU resources than asymmetric encryption algorithms. This allows the encryption and decryption of data to be fast when using a VPN.

When using symmetric encryption algorithms, like any other type of encryption, the longer the key, the longer it will take for someone to discover the key. Most encryption keys are between 112 and 256 bits. To ensure that the encryption is safe, a minimum key length of 128 bits should be used. Use a longer key for more secure communications.

Symmetric encryption algorithms are sometimes classified as either a block cypher or a stream cypher. Click the buttons to learn about these two cypher modes.

Block cyphers transform a fixed-length block of plaintext into a common block of ciphertext of 64 or 128 bits. Common block cyphers include DES with 64-bit block size and AES with 128-bit block size.

Well-known symmetric encryption algorithms are described in the table.

Symmetric Encryption Algorithms	Description
Data Encryption Standard (DES)	This is a legacy symmetric encryption algorithm. It uses a short key length that makes it insecure for most current uses.
3DES (Triple DES)	The is the replacement for DES and repeats the DES algorithm process three times. It should be avoided if possible as it is scheduled to be retired in 2023. If implemented, use very short key lifetimes.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)	AES is a popular and recommended symmetric encryption algorithm. It offers combinations of 128-, 192-, or 256-bit keys to encrypt 128, 192, or 256 bit-long data blocks.
Software-Optimized Encryption Algorithm (SEAL)	SEAL is a faster alternative symmetric encryption algorithm to AES. SEAL is a stream cypher that uses a 160-bit encryption key and has a lower impact on the CPU compared to other software-based algorithms.
Rivest ciphers (RC) series algorithms	This algorithm was developed by Ron Rivest. Several variations have been developed, but RC4 was the most prevalent in use. RC4 is a stream cypher that was used to secure web traffic. It has been found to have multiple vulnerabilities which have made it insecure. RC4 should not be used.

Asymmetric Encryption

Asymmetric algorithms, also called public-key algorithms, are designed so that the key that is used for encryption is different from the key that is used for decryption, as shown in the figure. The decryption key cannot, in any reasonable amount of time, be calculated from the encryption key and vice versa.

Asymmetric Encryption Example

Asymmetric algorithms use a public key and a private key. Both keys are capable of the encryption process, but the complementary paired key is required for decryption. The process is also reversible. Data that is encrypted with the public key requires the private key to decrypt. Asymmetric algorithms achieve confidentiality and authenticity by using this process.

Because neither party has a shared secret, very long key lengths must be used. Asymmetric encryption can use key lengths between 512 to 4,096 bits. Key lengths greater than or equal to 2,048 bits can be trusted, while key lengths of 1,024 or shorter are considered insufficient.

Examples of protocols that use asymmetric key algorithms include:

Internet Key Exchange (IKE) – This is a fundamental component of IPsec VPNs.
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) – This is now implemented as IETF standard Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Secure Shell (SSH) – This protocol provides a secure remote access connection to network devices.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) – This computer program provides cryptographic privacy and authentication. It is often used to increase the security of email communications.

Asymmetric algorithms are substantially slower than symmetric algorithms. Their design is based on computational problems, such as factoring extremely large numbers or computing discrete logarithms of extremely large numbers.

Because they are slow, asymmetric algorithms are typically used in low-volume cryptographic mechanisms, such as digital signatures and key exchange. However, the key management of asymmetric algorithms tends to be simpler than symmetric algorithms, because usually one of the two encryption or decryption keys can be made public.

Common examples of asymmetric encryption algorithms are described in the table.

Asymmetric Encryption Algorithm	Key Length	Description
Diffie-Hellman (DH)	512, 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096	The Diffie-Hellman algorithm allows two parties to agree on a key that they can use to encrypt messages they want to send to each other. The security of this algorithm depends on the assumption that it is easy to raise a number to a certain power, but difficult to compute which power was used given the number and the outcome.
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)	512 – 1024	DSS specifies DSA as the algorithm for digital signatures. DSA is a public key algorithm based on the ElGamal signature scheme. Signature creation speed is similar to RSA, but is 10 to 40 times slower for verification.
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman encryption algorithms (RSA)	512 to 2048	RSA is for public-key cryptography that is based on the current difficulty of factoring very large numbers. It is the first algorithm known to be suitable for signing, as well as encryption. It is widely used in electronic commerce protocols and is believed to be secure given sufficiently long keys and the use of up-to-date implementations.
EIGamal	512 – 1024	An asymmetric key encryption algorithm for public-key cryptography which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement. A disadvantage of the ElGamal system is that the encrypted message becomes very big, about twice the size of the original message and for this reason it is only used for small messages such as secret keys.
Elliptic curve techniques	224 or higher	Elliptic curve cryptography can be used to adapt many cryptographic algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal. The main advantage of elliptic curve cryptography is that the keys can be much smaller.

Asymmetric Encryption – Confidentiality

Asymmetric algorithms are used to provide confidentiality without pre-sharing a password. The confidentiality objective of asymmetric algorithms is initiated when the encryption process is started with the public key.
The process can be summarized using the formula:

Public Key (Encrypt) + Private Key (Decrypt) = Confidentiality
When the public key is used to encrypt the data, the private key must be used to decrypt the data. Only one host has a private key; therefore, confidentiality is achieved.

If the private key is compromised, another key pair must be generated to replace the compromised key.

Asymmetric Encryption – Authentication

The authentication objective of asymmetric algorithms is initiated when the encryption process is started with the private key.
The process can be summarized using the formula:

Private Key (Encrypt) + Public Key (Decrypt) = Authentication
When the private key is used to encrypt the data, the corresponding public key must be used to decrypt the data. Because only one host has the private key, only that host could have encrypted the message, providing authentication of the sender. Typically, no attempt is made to preserve the secrecy of the public key, so any number of hosts can decrypt the message. When a host successfully decrypts a message using a public key, it is trusted that the private key encrypted the message, which verifies who the sender is. This is a form of authentication.

Click the buttons to view how the private and public keys can be used to provide authentication to the data exchange between Bob and Alice.

Alice uses her private key

Bob requests the public key

Bob decrypts using the public key

Alice encrypts a message using her private key. Alice sends the encrypted message to Bob. Bob needs to authenticate that the message did indeed come from Alice.

Asymmetric Encryption – Integrity

Combining the two asymmetric encryption processes provides message confidentiality, authentication, and integrity.
The following example will be used to illustrate this process. In this example, a message will be ciphered using Bob’s public key and a ciphered hash will be encrypted using Alice’s private key to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity.

Alice uses Bob’s public key.

Alice encrypts a hash using her private key

Bob uses Alice’s public key to decrypt the hash

Bob uses his private key to decrypt the message

Alice wants to send a message to Bob ensuring that only Bob can read the document. In other words, Alice wants to ensure message confidentiality. Alice uses the public key of Bob to cypher the message. Only Bob will be able to decipher it using his private key.

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman (DH) is an asymmetric mathematical algorithm that allows two computers to generate an identical shared secret without having communicated before. The new shared key is never actually exchanged between the sender and receiver. However, because both parties know it, the key can be used by an encryption algorithm to encrypt traffic between the two systems.
Here are two examples of instances when DH is commonly used:

Data is exchanged using an IPsec VPN
SSH data is exchanged

To help illustrate how DH operates, refer to the figure.

Next, Alice and Bob will each select a secret colour. Alice chose red while Bob chose blue. These secret colours will never be shared with anyone. The secret colour represents the chosen secret private key of each party.

Alice and Bob now mix the shared common colour (yellow) with their respective secret colour to produce a public colour. Therefore, Alice will mix the yellow with her red colour to produce a public colour of orange. Bob will mix the yellow and the blue to produce a public colour of green.

Alice sends her public colour (orange) to Bob and Bob sends his public colour (green) to Alice.

Alice and Bob each mix the colour they received with their own, original secret colour (Red for Alice and blue for Bob.). The result is a final brown colour mixture that is identical to the partner’s final colour mixture. The brown colour represents the resulting shared secret key between Bob and Alice.

The security of DH is based on the fact that it uses very large numbers in its calculations. For example, a DH 1024-bit number is roughly equal to a decimal number of 309 digits. Considering that a billion is 10 decimal digits (1,000,000,000), one can easily imagine the complexity of working with not one, but multiple 309-digit decimal numbers.

Diffie-Hellman uses different DH groups to determine the strength of the key that is used in the key agreement process. The higher group numbers are more secure, but require additional time to compute the key. The following identifies the DH groups supported by Cisco IOS Software and their associated prime number value:

DH Group 1: 768 bits
DH Group 2: 1024 bits
DH Group 5: 1536 bits
DH Group 14: 2048 bits
DH Group 15: 3072 bits
DH Group 16: 4096 bits

Note: A DH key agreement can also be based on elliptic curve cryptography. DH groups 19, 20, and 24, which are based on elliptic curve cryptography, are also supported by Cisco IOS Software.

Unfortunately, asymmetric key systems are extremely slow for any sort of bulk encryption. This is why it is common to encrypt the bulk of the traffic using a symmetric algorithm, such as 3DES or AES and use the DH algorithm to create keys that will be used by the encryption algorithm.

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Digital Signatures In Cybersecurity: How To Use It

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Digital signatures in cybersecurity are a mathematical techniques used to provide authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation. Digital signatures have specific properties that enable entity authentication and data integrity.

In addition, digital signatures provide nonrepudiation of the transaction. In other words, the digital signature serves as legal proof that the data exchange did take place. Digital signatures use asymmetric cryptography.

The signature cannot be forged and provides proof that the signer, and no one else, signed the document.

Digital signatures are commonly used in the following two situations:

Code signing – This is used for data integrity and authentication purposes. Code signing is used to verify the integrity of executable files downloaded from a vendor website. It also uses signed digital certificates to authenticate and verify the identity of the site that is the source of the files.
Digital certificates – These are similar to a virtual ID card and used to authenticate the identity of the system with a vendor website and establish an encrypted connection to exchange confidential data.

There are three Digital Signature Standard (DSS) algorithms that are used for generating and verifying digital signatures:

Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) – DSA is the original standard for generating public and private key pairs, and for generating and verifying digital signatures.
Rivest-Shamir Adelman Algorithm (RSA) – RSA is an asymmetric algorithm that is commonly used for generating and verifying digital signatures.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) – ECDSA is a newer variant of DSA and provides digital signature authentication and non-repudiation with the added benefits of computational efficiency, small signature sizes, and minimal bandwidth.

In the 1990s, RSE Security Inc. started to publish public-key cryptography standards (PKCS). There were 15 PKCS, although 1 has been withdrawn as of the time of this writing. RSE published these standards because they had the patents to the standards and wished to promote them. PKCS are not industry standards, but are well recognized in the security industry and have recently begun to become relevant to standards organizations such as the IETF and PKIX working group.

Digital Signatures for Code Signing

Digital signatures are commonly used to provide assurance of the authenticity and integrity of software code. Executable files are wrapped in a digitally signed envelope, which allows the end-user to verify the signature before installing the software.
Digitally signing code provides several assurances about the code:

The code is authentic and is actually sourced by the publisher.
The code has not been modified since it left the software publisher.
The publisher undeniably published the code. This provides nonrepudiation of the act of publishing.

The US Government Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-3, specifies that software available for download on the internet is to be digitally signed and verified.

The purpose of digitally signed software is to ensure that the software has not been tampered with and that it originated from the trusted source as claimed. Digital signatures serve as verification that the code has not been tampered with by threat actors and malicious code has not been inserted into the file by a third party.

Click the buttons to access the properties of a file that has a digitally signed certificate.

File Properties

Digital Signatures

Digital Signatures Details

Certificate Information

Certification Path

This executable file was downloaded from the internet. The file contains a software tool from Cisco Systems.

Digital Signatures for Digital Certificates

A digital certificate is equivalent to an electronic passport. It enables users, hosts, and organizations to securely exchange information over the Internet. Specifically, a digital certificate is used to authenticate and verify that a user who is sending a message is who they claim to be. Digital certificates can also be used to provide confidentiality for the receiver with the means to encrypt a reply.

Digital certificates are similar to physical certificates. For example, the paper-based Cisco Certified Network Associate Security (CCNA-S) certificate in the figure identifies who the certificate is issued to, who authorized the certificate, and for how long the certificate is valid. Digital certificates also provide similar information.

The digital certificate independently verifies an identity. Digital signatures are used to verify that an artefact, such as a file or message, is sent from the verified individual. In other words, a certificate verifies identity, a signature verifies that something comes from that identity.

This scenario will help you understand how a digital signature is used. Bob is confirming an order with Alice. Alice is ordering from Bob’s website. Alice has connected with Bob’s website, and after the certificate has been verified, Bob’s certificate is stored on Alice’s website. The certificate contains Bob’s public key. The public key is used to verify Bob’s digital signature.

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Authority And PKI Trust System: The Facts

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Internet traffic consists of traffic between two parties. When establishing an asymmetric connection between two hosts, the hosts will exchange their public key information. An SSL certificate is a digital certificate that confirms the identity of a website domain. To implement SSL on your website, you purchase an SSL certificate for your domain from an SSL Certificate provider. The trusted third party does an in-depth investigation prior to the issuance of credentials. In this article, I want to talk about Authority and PKI Trust System.

After this in-depth investigation, the third-party issues credentials (i.e. digital certificate) that are difficult to forge. From that point forward, all individuals who trust the third party simply accept the credentials that the third-party issues. When computers attempt to connect to a website over HTTPS, the web browser checks the website’s security certificate and verifies that it is valid and originated with a reliable CA.

This validates that the website identity is true. The certificate is saved locally by the web browser and is then used in subsequent transactions. The website’s public key is included in the certificate and is used to verify future communications between the website and the client.

These trusted third parties provide services similar to governmental licensing bureaus. The figure illustrates how a driver’s license is analogous to a digital certificate.

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) consists of specifications, systems, and tools that are used to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. The certificate authority (CA) is an organization that creates digital certificates by tying a public key to a confirmed identity, such as a website or individual. The PKI is an intricate system that is designed to safeguard digital identities from hacking by even the most sophisticated threat actors or nation-states.

Some examples of Certificate Authorities are IdenTrust, DigiCert, Sectigo, GlobalSign, and GoDaddy. These CAs charge for their services. Let’s Encrypt is a non-profit CA that offers certificates free of charge.

The Public Key Infrastructure

PKI is needed to support the large-scale distribution and identification of public encryption keys. The PKI framework facilitates a highly scalable trust relationship.
It consists of the hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates.

PKI certificates contain an entity’s or individual’s public key, it’s purpose, the certificate authority (CA) that validated and issued the certificate, the date range during which the certificate is valid, and the algorithm used to create the signature.
The certificate store resides on a local computer and stores issued certificates and private keys.
The PKI Certificate of Authority (CA) is a trusted third party that issues PKI certificates to entities and individuals after verifying there identity. It signs these certificates using it’s private key.
The certificate database stores all certificates approved by the CA.

The next figure shows how the elements of the PKI interoperate:

In this example, Bob has received his digital certificate from the CA. This certificate is used whenever Bob communicates with other parties.
Bob communicates with Alice.
When Alice receives Bob’s digital certificate, she communicates with the trusted CA to validate Bob’s identity.

Issues PKI Certificate. Bob initially requests a certificate from the CA. The CA authenticates Bob and stores Bob’s PKI certificate in the certificate database.
Exchanges PKI Certificate. Bob communicates with Alice using his PKI certificate.
Verifies PKI Certificate. Alice communicates with the trusted CA using the CA’s public key. The CA refers to the certificate database to validate Bob’s PKI certificate.

Note: Not all PKI certificates are directly received from a CA. A registration authority (RA) is a subordinate CA and is certified by a root CA to issue certificates for specific uses.

The PKI Authorities System

Many vendors provide CA servers as a managed service or as an end-user product. Some of these vendors include Symantec Group (VeriSign), Comodo, Go Daddy Group, GlobalSign, and DigiCert among others.

Organizations may also implement private PKIs using Microsoft Server or Open SSL.
CAs, especially those that are outsourced, issue certificates based on classes that determine how trusted a certificate is.

The table provides a description of the classes. The class number is determined by how rigorous the procedure was that verified the identity of the holder when the certificate was issued. The higher the class number, the more trusted the certificate. Therefore, a class 5 certificate is trusted much more than a lower-class certificate.

Class	Description
0	Used for testing in situations in which no checks have been performed.
1	Used by individuals who require verification of email.
2	Used by organizations for which proof of identity is required.
3	Used for servers and software signing. Independent verification and checking of identity and authority is done by the certificate authority.
4	Used for online business transactions between companies.
5	Used for private organizations or government security.

For example, a class 1 certificate might require an email reply from the holder to confirm that they wish to enrol. This kind of confirmation is a weak authentication of the holder. For a class 3 or 4 certificates, the future holder must prove identity and authenticate the public key by showing up in person with at least two official ID documents.

Some CA public keys are preloaded, such as those listed in web browsers. The figure displays various VeriSign certificates contained in the certificate store on the host. Any certificates signed by any of the CAs in the list will be seen by the browser as legitimate and will be trusted automatically.

Note: An enterprise can also implement PKI for internal use. PKI can be used to authenticate employees who are accessing the network. In this case, the enterprise is its own CA.

The PKI Trust System

PKIs can form different topologies of trust. The simplest is the single-root PKI topology.
As shown in the figure below, a single CA, called the root CA, issues all the certificates to the end-users, which are usually within the same organization. The benefit of this approach is its simplicity. However, it is difficult to scale to a large environment because it requires a strictly centralized administration, which creates a single point of failure.

Single-Root PKI Topology

On larger networks, PKI CAs may be linked using two basic architectures:
Cross-certified CA topologies – As shown in the figure below, this is a peer-to-peer model in which individual CAs establish trust relationships with other CAs by cross-certifying CA certificates. Users in either CA domain are also assured that they can trust each other.

This provides redundancy and eliminates the single point of failure.

Cross-Certified CA

Hierarchical CA topologies – As shown in the figure below, the highest-level CA is called the root CA. It can issue certificates to end-users and to a subordinate CA. The sub-CAs could be created to support various business units, domains, or communities of trust.

The root CA maintains the established “community of trust” by ensuring that each entity in the hierarchy conforms to a minimum set of practices. The benefits of this topology include increased scalability and manageability. This topology works well in most large organizations. However, it can be difficult to determine the chain of the signing process.

A hierarchical and cross-certification topology can be combined to create a hybrid infrastructure. An example would be when two hierarchical communities want to cross-certify each other in order for members of each community to trust each other.

Hierarchical CA

Interoperability of Different PKI Vendors

Interoperability between a PKI and its supporting services, such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and X.500 directories, is a concern because many CA vendors have proposed and implemented proprietary solutions instead of waiting for standards to develop.

Note: LDAP and X.500 are protocols that are used to query a directory service, such as Microsoft Active Directory, to verify a username and password.
To address this interoperability concern, the IETF published the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework (RFC 2527). The X.509 version 3 (X.509 v3) standard defines the format of a digital certificate.

X.509v3 Applications

1234

InternetEnterprise NetworkVPN ConcentratorExternal Web ServerInternet Mail ServerCisco Secure ACSCA ServerSSLS/MIMEEAP-TLSIPsec

SSL – Secure web servers use X.509.v3 for website authentication in the SSL and TLS protocols, while web browsers use X.509v3 to implement HTTPS client certificates. SSL is the most widely used certificate-based authentication.
IPsec – IPsec VPNs use X.509 certificates when RSA-based authentication is used for internet key exchange (IKE).
S/MIME – User mail agents that support mail protection with the Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) protocol use X.509 certificates.
EAP-TLS – Cisco switches can use certificates to authenticate end devices that connect to LAN ports using 802.1x between the adjacent devices. The authentication can be proxied to a central ACS via the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS (EAP-TLS).

Certificate Enrollment, Authentication, and Revocation

The first step in the CA authentication procedure is to securely obtain a copy of the CA’s public key. All systems that leverage the PKI must have the CA’s public key, which is called the self-signed certificate. The CA public key verifies all the certificates issued by the CA and is vital for the proper operation of the PKI.

Note: Only a root CA can issue a self-signed certificate that is recognized or verified by other CAs within the PKI.

For many systems such as web browsers, the distribution of CA certificates is handled automatically. The web browser comes pre-installed with a set of public CA root certificates. Organizations and their website domains push their public certificates to website visitors. CAs and certificate domain registrars create and distribute private and public certificates to clients that purchase certificates.

The certificate enrollment process is used by a host system to enrol with a PKI. To do so, CA certificates are retrieved in-band over a network, and the authentication is done out-of-band (OOB) using the telephone. The system enrolling with the PKI contacts a CA to request and obtain a digital identity certificate for itself and to get the CA’s self-signed certificate.

The final stage verifies that the CA certificate was authentic and is performed using an out-of-band method such as the Plain Old Telephone System (POTS) to obtain the fingerprint of the valid CA identity certificate.

Authentication no longer requires the presence of the CA server, and each user exchanges their certificates containing public keys.
Certificates must sometimes be revoked. For example, a digital certificate can be revoked if a key is compromised or if it is no longer needed.
Here are two of the most common methods of revocation:

Certificate Revocation List (CRL) – A list of revoked certificate serial numbers that have been invalidated because they expired. PKI entities regularly poll the CRL repository to receive the current CRL.
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) – An internet protocol used to query an OCSP server for the revocation status of an X.509 digital certificate. Revocation information is immediately pushed to an online database.

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Analysing Applications And Its Impact On Cryptography

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In my previous article, I have talked about all that you need to know about network security. In this article, I will be talking about applications and their impacts on cryptography. Where can PKI be used by an enterprise?

The following provides a shortlist of common uses of PKIs:

SSL/TLS certificate-based peer authentication
Secure network traffic using IPsec VPNs
HTTPS Web traffic
Control access to the network using 802.1x authentication
Secure email using the S/MIME protocol
Secure instant messaging
Approve and authorize applications with Code Signing
Protect user data with the Encryption File System (EFS)
Implement two-factor authentication with smart cards
Securing USB storage devices

Encrypted Network Transactions

A security analyst must be able to recognize and solve potential problems related to permitting PKI-related solutions on the enterprise network.

Consider how the increase of SSL/TLS traffic poses a major security risk to enterprises because the traffic is encrypted and cannot be intercepted and monitored by normal means. Users can introduce malware or leak confidential information over an SSL/TLS connection.

Threat actors can use SSL/TLS to introduce regulatory compliance violations, viruses, malware, data loss, and intrusion attempts in a network.

Other SSL/TLS-related issues may be associated with validating the certificate of a web server. When this occurs, web browsers will display a security warning. PKI-related issues that are associated with security warnings include:

Validity date range – The X.509v3 certificates specify “not before” and “not after” dates. If the current date is outside the range, the web browser displays a message. Expired certificates may simply be the result of administrator oversight, but they may also reflect more serious conditions.
Signature validation error – If a browser cannot validate the signature on the certificate, there is no assurance that the public key in the certificate is authentic. Signature validation will fail if the root certificate of the CA hierarchy is not available in the browser’s certificate store.

The figure shows an example of a signature validation error with the Cisco AnyConnect Mobility VPN Client.

Signature Validation Error

Some of these issues can be avoided due to the fact that the SSL/TLS protocols are extensible and modular. This is known as a cypher suite. The key components of the cypher suite are the Message Authentication Code Algorithm (MAC), the encryption algorithm, the key exchange algorithm, and the authentication algorithm. These can be changed without replacing the entire protocol.

This is very helpful because the different algorithms continue to evolve. As cryptanalysis continues to reveal flaws in these algorithms, the cypher suite can be updated to patch these flaws. When the protocol versions within the cypher suite change, the version number of SSL/TLS changes as well.

Encryption and Security Monitoring

Network monitoring becomes more challenging when packets are encrypted. However, security analysts must be aware of those challenges and address them as best as possible.

For instance, when site-to-site VPNs are used, the IPS should be positioned so it can monitor unencrypted traffic.

However, the increased use of HTTPS in the enterprise network introduces new challenges. Since HTTPS introduces end-to-end encrypted HTTP traffic (via TLS/SSL), it is not as easy to peek into user traffic.

Security analysts must know how to circumvent and solve these issues. Here is a list of some of the things that a security analyst could do:

Configure rules to distinguish between SSL and non-SSL traffic, HTTPS and non-HTTPS SSL traffic.
Enhance security through server certificate validation using CRLs and OCSP.
Implement antimalware protection and URL filtering of HTTPS content.
Deploy a Cisco SSL Appliance to decrypt SSL traffic and send it to intrusion prevention system (IPS) appliances to identify risks normally hidden by SSL.

Cryptography is dynamic and always changing. A security analyst must maintain a good understanding of cryptographic algorithms and operations to be able to investigate cryptography-related security incidents.

There are two main ways in which cryptography impacts security investigations. First, attacks can be directed to specifically target the encryption algorithms themselves.

After the algorithm has been cracked and the attacker has obtained the keys, any encrypted data that has been captured can be decrypted by the attacker and read, thus exposing private data. Secondly, the security investigation is also affected because data can be hidden in plain sight by encrypting it.

For example, command and control traffic that is encrypted with TLS/SSL most likely cannot be seen by a firewall. The command and control traffic between a command and control server and an infected computer in a secure network cannot be stopped if it cannot be seen and understood.

The attacker would be able to continue using encrypted commands to infect more computers and possibly create a botnet. This type of traffic can be detected by decrypting the traffic and comparing it with known attack signatures, or by detecting anomalous TLS/SSL traffic. This is either very difficult and time-consuming or a hit-or-miss process.

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Antimalware Protection In Cybersecurity: Facts To Note

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The term “endpoint” is defined in various ways. For the purpose of this course, we can define endpoints as hosts on the network that can access or be accessed by other hosts on the network. This obviously includes computers and servers, however many other devices can also access the network. With the rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT), other types of devices are now endpoints on the network.

This includes networked security cameras, controllers, and even light bulbs and appliances. Each endpoint is potentially a way for malicious software to gain access to a network. In addition, new technologies, such as the cloud, expand the boundaries of enterprise networks to include locations on the internet for which enterprises are not responsible. This article discusses some of the facts that you need to know about antimalware protection in cybersecurity.

Devices that remotely access networks through VPNs are also endpoints that need to be considered. These endpoints could inject malware into the VPN network from the public network.
The following points summarize some of the reasons why malware remains a major challenge:

According to research from Cybersecurity Ventures, by 2021 a new organization will fall victim to a ransomware attack every 11 seconds.
Ransomware attacks will cost the global economy $6 trillion annually by 2021.
In 2018, 8 million attempts to steal system resources using cryptojacking malware were observed.
From 2016 to early 2017, global spam volume increased dramatically. 8 to 10 percent of this spam can be considered to be malicious, as shown in the figure.
In 2020, it is projected that the average number of cyber attacks per macOS device will rise from 4.8 in 2018 to 14.2 in 2020.
Several common types of malware have been found to significantly change features in less than 24 hours in order to evade detection.

Malicious Spam Percentage

Endpoint Security

News media commonly cover external network attacks on enterprise networks. These are some examples of such attacks:

DoS attacks on an organization’s network to degrade or even halt public access to it
Breach of an organization’s webserver to deface their web presence
Breach of an organization’s data servers and hosts to steal confidential information

Various network security devices are required to protect the network perimeter from outside access. As shown in the figure, these devices could include a hardened router that is providing VPN services, a next-generation firewall (ASA, in the figure), an IPS appliance, and an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) services server (AAA Server, in the figure).

However, many attacks originate from inside the network. Therefore, securing an internal LAN is nearly as important as securing the outside network perimeter. Without a secure LAN, users within an organization are still susceptible to network threats and outages that can directly affect an organization’s productivity and profit margin. After an internal host is infiltrated, it can become a starting point for an attacker to gain access to critical system devices, such as servers and sensitive information.

Specifically, there are two internal LAN elements to secure:

Endpoints – Hosts commonly consist of laptops, desktops, printers, servers, and IP phones, all of which are susceptible to malware-related attacks.
Network infrastructure – LAN infrastructure devices interconnect endpoints and typically include switches, wireless devices, and IP telephony devices. Most of these devices are susceptible to LAN-related attacks including MAC address table overflow attacks, spoofing attacks, DHCP related attacks, LAN storm attacks, STP manipulation attacks, and VLAN attacks.

Host-Based Malware Protection

The network perimeter is always expanding. People access corporate network resources with mobile devices that use remote access technologies such as VPN. These same devices are also used on unsecured or minimally secured, public and home networks. Host-based antimalware/antivirus software and host-based firewalls are used to protect these devices.

Antivirus/Antimalware Software
This is software that is installed on a host to detect and mitigate viruses and malware. Examples are Windows Defender Virus & Threat Protection, Cisco AMP for Endpoints, Norton Security, McAfee, Trend Micro, and others. Antimalware programs may detect viruses using three different approaches:

Signature-based – This approach recognizes various characteristics of known malware files.
Heuristics-based – This approach recognizes general features shared by various types of malware.
Behaviour-based – This approach employs analysis of suspicious behaviour.

Many antivirus programs are able to provide real-time protection by analyzing data as it is used by the endpoint. These programs also scan for existing malware that may have entered the system prior to it being recognizable in real-time.

Host-based antivirus protection is also known as agent-based. Agent-based antivirus runs on every protected machine. Agentless antivirus protection performs scans on hosts from a centralized system. Agentless systems have become popular for virtualized environments in which multiple OS instances are running on a host simultaneously.

Agent-based antivirus running in each virtualized system can be a serious drain on system resources. Agentless antivirus for virtual hosts involves the use of a special security virtual appliance that performs optimized scanning tasks on the virtual hosts. An example of this is VMware’s vShield.

Host-based Firewall
This software is installed on a host. It restricts incoming and outgoing connections to connections initiated by that host only. Some firewall software can also prevent a host from becoming infected and stop infected hosts from spreading malware to other hosts. This function is included in some operating systems. For example, Windows includes Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security as shown in the figure.

Other solutions are produced by other companies or organizations. The Linux iptables and TCP Wrappers tools are examples.

Host-based Security Suites
It is recommended to install a host-based suite of security products on home networks as well as business networks. These host-based security suites include antivirus, anti-phishing, safe browsing, a Host-based intrusion prevention system, and firewall capabilities. These various security measures provide a layered defence that will protect against the most common threats.

In addition to the protection functionality provided by host-based security products is the telemetry function. Most host-based security software includes robust logging functionality that is essential to cybersecurity operations. Some host-based security programs will submit logs to a central location for analysis.

There are many host-based security programs and suites available to users and enterprises. The independent testing laboratory AV-TEST provides high-quality reviews of host-based protections, as well as information about many other security products.
Search the internet for the AVTest organization to learn more about AV-TEST.

Network-Based Malware Protection

New security architectures for the borderless network address security challenges by having endpoints use network scanning elements. These devices provide many more layers of scanning than a single endpoint possibly could. Network-based malware prevention devices are also capable of sharing information among themselves to make better-informed decisions.

Protecting endpoints in a borderless network can be accomplished using network-based, as well as host-based techniques, as shown in the figure above. The following are examples of devices and techniques that implement host protections at the network level.

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) – This provides endpoint protection from viruses and malware.
Email Security Appliance (ESA) – This provides filtering of SPAM and potentially malicious emails before they reach the endpoint. An example is the Cisco ESA.
Web Security Appliance (WSA) – This provides filtering of websites and blacklisting to prevent hosts from reaching dangerous locations on the web. The Cisco WSA provides control over how users access the internet and can enforce acceptable use policies, control access to specific sites and services, and scan for malware.
Network Admission Control (NAC) – This permits only authorized and compliant systems to connect to the network.

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Host Based Firewalls In Cybersecurity: The Facts

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Host-based personal firewalls are standalone software programs that control traffic entering or leaving a computer. Firewall apps are also available for Android phones and tablets. In this article, I want to talk about some of the facts that you need to know about host-based firewalls in cybersecurity.

Host-based firewalls may use a set of predefined policies, or profiles, to control packets entering and leaving a computer. They also may have rules that can be directly modified or created to control access based on addresses, protocols, and ports. Host-based firewall applications can also be configured to issue alerts to users if suspicious behaviour is detected.
They can then offer the user the ability to allow an offending application to run or to be prevented from running in the future.

Logging varies depending on the firewall application. It typically includes the date and time of the event, whether the connection was allowed or denied, information about the source or destination IP addresses of packets, and the source and destination ports of the encapsulated segments.
In addition, common activities such as DNS lookups and other routine events can show up in host-based firewall logs, so filtering and other parsing techniques are useful for inspecting large amounts of log data.

One approach to intrusion prevention is the use of distributed firewalls. Distributed firewalls combine features of host-based firewalls with centralized management. The management function pushes rules to the hosts and may also accept log files from the hosts.

Whether installed completely on the host or distributed, host-based firewalls are an important layer of network security along with network-based firewalls. Here are some examples of host-based firewalls:

Windows Defender Firewall – First included with Windows XP, Windows Firewall (now Windows Defender Firewall) uses a profile-based approach to firewall functionality. Access to public networks is assigned the restrictive Public firewall profile. The Private profile is for computers that are isolated from the internet by other security devices, such as a home router with firewall functionality. The Domain profile is the third available profile. It is chosen for connections to a trusted network, such as a business network that is assumed to have an adequate security infrastructure. Windows Firewall has logging functionality and can be centrally managed with customized group security policies from a management server such as System Center 2012 Configuration Manager.
iptables – This is an application that allows Linux system administrators to configure network access rules that are part of the Linux kernel Netfilter modules.
nftables – The successor to iptables, nftables is a Linux firewall application that uses a simple virtual machine in the Linux kernel. Code is executed within the virtual machine that inspects network packets and implements decision rules regarding packet acceptance and forwarding.
TCP Wrappers – This is a rule-based access control and logging system for Linux. Packet filtering is based on IP addresses and network services.

Host-Based Intrusion Detection

The distinction between host-based intrusion detection and intrusion prevention is blurred. In fact, some sources refer to host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems (HIPDS). Because the industry seems to favour the use of the acronym HIDS, we will use it in our discussion here.

A host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) is designed to protect hosts against known and unknown malware.

A HIDS can perform detailed monitoring and report on the system configuration and application activity. It can provide log analysis, event correlation, integrity checking, policy enforcement, rootkit detection, and alerting. A HIDS will frequently include a management server endpoint, as shown in the figure.

A HIDS is a comprehensive security application that combines the functionalities of antimalware applications with firewall functionality. A HIDS not only detects malware but also can prevent it from executing if it should reach a host. Because the HIDS software must run directly on the host, it is considered an agent-based system.

Host-based Intrusion Detection Architecture

HIDS Operation

It can be said that host-based security systems function as both detection and prevention systems because they prevent known attacks and detect unknown potential attacks.

A HIDS uses both proactive and reactive strategies. A HIDS can prevent intrusion because it uses signatures to detect known malware and prevent it from infecting a system. However, this strategy is only good against known threats. Signatures are not effective against new, or zero-day, threats.

In addition, some malware families exhibit polymorphism. This means that variations of a type, or family, of malware, may be created by attackers that will evade signature-based detections by changing aspects of the malware signature just enough so that it will not be detected. An additional set of strategies are used to detect the possibility of successful intrusions by malware that evades signature detection:

Anomaly-based – Host system behaviour is compared to a learned baseline model of normal behaviour. Significant deviations from the baseline are interpreted as the result of some sort of intrusion. If an intrusion is detected, the HIDS can log details of the intrusion, send alerts to security management systems, and take action to prevent the attack. The measured baseline is derived from both user and system behaviour. Because many things other than malware can cause system behaviour to change, anomaly detection can create many erroneous results which can increase the workload for security personnel and also lower the credibility of the system.

Policy-based – Normal system behaviour is described by rules, or the violation of rules, that are predefined. Violation of these policies will result in action by the HIDS. The HIDS may attempt to shut down software processes that have violated the rules and can log these events and alert personnel to violations. Most HIDS software comes with a set of predefined rules. With some systems, administrators can create custom policies that can be distributed to hosts from a central policy management system.

HIDS Products

There are a number of HIDS products on the market today. Most of them utilize the software on the host and some sort of centralized security management functionality that allows integration with network security monitoring services and threat intelligence. Examples are Cisco AMP, AlienVault USM, Tripwire, and Open Source HIDS SECurity (OSSEC).

OSSEC uses a central management server and agents that are installed on individual hosts. Currently, agents are available for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Solaris platforms. The OSSEC server, or Manager, can also receive and analyze alerts from a variety of network devices and firewalls over Syslog.

OSSEC monitors system logs on hosts and also conducts file integrity checking. OSSEC can detect rootkits and other malware, and can also be configured to run scripts or applications on hosts in response to event triggers.

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Network Profiling In Cybersecurity: Facts To Note

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In order to detect serious security incidents, it is important to understand, characterize, and analyze information about normal network functioning. Networks, servers, and hosts all exhibit typical behaviour for a given point in time. Network and device understanding network profiling in cybersecurity

Care must be taken when capturing baseline data so that all normal network operations are included in the baseline. In addition, it is important that the baseline is current. It should not include network performance data that is no longer part of normal functioning.

For example, rises in-network utilization during periodic server backup operations is part of normal network functioning and should be part of the baseline data. However, measurement of traffic that corresponds to outside access to an internal server that has been moved to the cloud would not be.

A means of capturing just the right period for baseline measurement is known as sliding window anomaly detection. It defines a window that is most representative of network operation and deletes data that is out of date.

This process continues with repeated baseline measurements to ensure that baseline measurement statistics depict network operation with maximum accuracy.

Increased utilization of WAN links at unusual times can indicate a network breach and exfiltration of data. Hosts that begin to access obscure internet servers, resolve domains that are obtained through dynamic DNS, or use protocols or services that are not needed by the system user can also indicate compromise. Deviations in network behavior are difficult to detect if normal behavior is not known.

Tools like NetFlow and Wireshark can be used to characterize normal network traffic characteristics. Because organizations can make different demands on there networks depending on the time of day or day of the year, network baselining should be carried out over an extended period. The figure displays some questions to ask when establishing a network baseline.

Elements of a Network Profile

The table lists important elements of the network profile.

Network Profile Element	Description
Session duration	This is the time between the establishment of a data flow and it’s termination.
Total throughput	This is the amount of data passing from a given source to a given destination in a given period of time.
Ports used	This is a list of TCP or UDP processes that are available to accept data.
Critical asset address space	These are the IP addresses or the logical location of essential systems or data.

In addition, a profile of the types of traffic that typically enter and leave the network is an important tool in understanding network behavior. Malware can use unusual ports that may not be typically seen during normal network operation.

Host-to-host traffic is another important metric. Most network clients communicate directly with servers, so an increase of traffic between clients can indicate that malware is spreading laterally through the network.

Finally, changes in user behavior, as revealed by AAA, server logs, or a user profiling system like Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) is another valuable indicator. Knowing how individual users typically use the network leads to detection of potential compromise of user accounts.

A user who suddenly begins logging in to the network at strange times from a remote location should raise alarms if this behavior is a deviation from a known norm.

Server Profiling

Server profiling is used to establish the accepted operating state of servers. A server profile is a security baseline for a given server. It establishes the network, user, and application parameters that are accepted for a specific server.

In order to establish a server profile, it is important to understand the function that a server is intended to perform in a network. From there, various operating and usage parameters can be defined and documented.
The table lists elements of a server profile.

Server Profile Element	Description
Listening ports	These are the TCP and UDP daemons and ports that are normally allowed to be open on the server.
Logged in users and accounts	These are the parameters defining user access and behaviour.
Service accounts	These are the definitions of the type of service that an application is allowed to run.
Software environment	These are the tasks, processes, and applications that are permitted to run on the server.

Network Anomaly Detection

Network behaviour is described by a large amount of diverse data such as the features of a packet flow, features of the packets themselves, and telemetry from multiple sources. One approach to the detection of network attacks is the analysis of this diverse, unstructured data using Big Data analytics techniques. This is known as network behaviour analysis (NBA).

This entails the use of sophisticated statistical and machine learning techniques to compare normal performance baselines with network performance at a given time. Significant deviations can be indicators of compromise. In addition, network behaviour can be analyzed for known network behaviours that indicate compromise.

Anomaly detection can recognize network traffic caused by worm activity that exhibits scanning behaviour. Anomaly detection also can identify infected hosts on the network that are scanning for other vulnerable hosts.
The figure illustrates a simplified version of an algorithm designed to detect an unusual condition at the border routers of an enterprise.

For example, the cybersecurity analyst could provide the following values:

X = 5
Y = 100
Z = 30
N = 500

Now, the algorithm can be interpreted as: Every 5th minute, get a sampling of 1/100th of the flows during second 30. If the number of flows is greater than 500, generate an alarm. If the number of flows is less than 500, do nothing. This is a simple example of using a traffic profile to identify the potential for data loss.

In addition to statistical and behavioural approaches to anomaly detection is rule-based anomaly detection. Rule-based detection analyzes decoded packets for attacks based on pre-defined patterns.

Network Vulnerability Testing

Most organizations connect to public networks in some way due to the need to access the internet. These organizations must also provide internet-facing services of various types to the public. Because of the vast number of potential vulnerabilities, and the fact that new vulnerabilities can be created within an organization network and it’s internet-facing services, periodic security testing is essential.

The table lists various types of tests that can be performed.

Term	Description
Risk Analysis	This is a discipline in which analysts evaluate the risk posed by vulnerabilities to a specific organization. Risk analysis includes an assessment of the likelihood of attacks, identifies types of likely threat actors, and evaluates the impact of successful exploits on the organization.
Vulnerability Assessment	This test employs software to scan internet-facing servers and internal networks for various types of vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include unknown infections, weaknesses in web-facing database services, missing software patches, unnecessary listening ports, etc. Tools for vulnerability assessment include the open-source OpenVAS platform, Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer, Nessus, Qualys, and FireEye Mandiant services. Vulnerability assessment includes, but goes beyond, port scanning.
Penetration Testing	This type of test uses authorized simulated attacks to test the strength of network security. Internal personnel with hacker experience, or professional ethical hackers, identify assets that could be targeted by threat actors. A series of exploits are used to test the security of those assets. Simulated exploit software tools are frequently used. Penetration testing does not only verify that vulnerabilities exist, it actually exploits those vulnerabilities to determine the potential impact of a successful exploit. An individual penetration test is often known as a pen test. Metasploit is a tool used in penetration testing. CORE Impact offers penetration testing software and services.

The table lists examples of activities and tools that are used in vulnerability testing.

Activity	Description	Tools
Risk analysis	Individuals conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of attacks on core company assets and functioning	Internal or external consultants, risk management frameworks
Vulnerability Assessment	Patch management, host scans, port scanning, other vulnerability scans and services	OpenVas, Microsoft Baseline Analyzer, Nessus, Qualys, Nmap
Penetration Testing	Use of hacking techniques and tools to penetrate network defences and identify the depth of potential penetration	Metasploit, CORE Impact, ethical hackers

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Common Vulnerability Scoring System: Facts To Note

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The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a risk assessment tool that is designed to convey the common attributes and severity of vulnerabilities in computer hardware and software systems. The third revision, CVSS 3.0, is a vendor-neutral, industry-standard, open framework for weighting the risks of a vulnerability using a variety of metrics. These weights combine to provide a score of the risk inherent in a vulnerability. The numeric score can be used to determine the urgency of the vulnerability, and the priority of addressing it. The benefits of the CVSS can be summarized as follows:

It provides standardized vulnerability scores that should be meaningful across organizations.
It provides an open framework with the meaning of each metric openly available to all users.
It helps prioritize risk in a way that is meaningful to individual organizations.

The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) has been designated as the custodian of the CVSS to promote it’s adoption globally. The Version 3 standard was developed with contributions by Cisco and other industry partners. Version 3.1 was released in June of 2019. The figure displays the specification page for the CVSS at the FIRST website.

CVSS Metric Groups

Before performing a CVSS assessment, it is important to know key terms that are used in the assessment instrument.

Many of the metrics address the role of what the CVSS calls an authority. An authority is a computer entity, such as a database, operating system, or virtual sandbox, that grants and manages access and privileges to users.

CVSS Metric Groups

This represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are constant over time and across contexts. It has two classes of metrics:

Exploitability – These are features of the exploit such as the vector, complexity, and user interaction required by the exploit.
Impact metrics – The impacts of the exploit are rooted in the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

CVSS Base Metric Group

Criteria	Description
Attack vector	This is a metric that reflects the proximity of the threat actor to the vulnerable component. The more remote the threat actor is to the component, the higher the severity. Threat actors close to your network or inside your network are easier to detect and mitigate.
Attack complexity	This is a metric that expresses the number of components, software, hardware, or networks, that are beyond the attacker’s control and that must be present for a vulnerability to be successfully exploited.
Privileges required	This is a metric that captures the level of access that is required for a successful exploit of the vulnerability.
User interaction	This metric expresses the presence or absence of the requirement for user interaction for an exploit to be successful.
Scope	This metric expresses whether multiple authorities must be involved in an exploit. This is expressed as whether the initial authority changes to a second authority during the exploit.

The Base Metric Group Impact metrics increase with the degree or consequence of loss due to the impacted component. The table lists the impact metric components.

Term	Description
Confidentiality Impact	This is a metric that measures the impact to confidentiality due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to the limiting of access to only authorized users.
Integrity Impact	This is a metric that measures the impact on integrity due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and authenticity of the information.
Availability Impact	This is a metric that measures the impact to availability due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Availability refers to the accessibility of information and network resources. Attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability.

The CVSS Process

The CVSS Base Metrics Group is designed as a way to assess security vulnerabilities that are found in software and hardware systems. It describes the severity of a vulnerability based on the characteristics of a successful exploit of the vulnerability. The other metric groups modify the base severity score by accounting for how the base severity rating is affected by time and environmental factors.

The CVSS process uses a tool called the CVSS v3.1 Calculator, shown in the figure.

The calculator is like a questionnaire in which choices are made that describe the vulnerability for each metric group. After all choices are made, a score is generated. Pop-up text that explains each metric and metric value is displayed by hovering the mouse over each. Choices are made by choosing one of the values for the metric. Only one choice can be made per metric.

The CVSS calculator can be accessed on the CVSS portion of the FIRST website.
A detailed user guide that defines metric criteria, examples of assessments of common vulnerabilities, and the relationship of metric values to the final score is available to support the process.

After the Base Metric group is completed, the numeric severity rating is displayed, as shown in the figure.

A vector string is also created that summarizes the choices made. If other metric groups are completed, those values are appended to the vector string.

The string consists of the initial(s) for the metric, and an abbreviated value for the selected metric value separated by a colon. The metric-value pairs are separated by slashes. The vector strings allow the results of the assessment to be easily shared and compared.

The table lists the key for the Base Metric group.

Metric Name	Initials	Possible Values	Values
Attack Vector	AV	[N, A, L, P]	N = Network A = Adjacent L = Local P = Physical
Attack Complexity	AC	[L, H]	L = Low H = High
Privileges Required	PR	[N, L, H]	N = None L = Low H = High
User Interaction	UI	[N, R]	N = None R = Required
Scope	S	[U, C]	U = Unchanged C = Changed
Confidentiality Impact	C	[H, L, N]	H = High L = Low N = None
Integrity Impact	I	[H, L, N]	H = High L = Low N = None
Availability Impact	A	[H, L, N]	H = High L = Low N = None

The values for the numeric severity rating string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N are listed in the table.

Metric Name	Values
Attack Vector, AV	Network
Attack Complexity, AC	Low
Privileges Required, PR	High
User Interaction, UI	None
Scope, S	Unchanged
Confidentiality Impact, C	Low
Integrity Impact, I	Low
Availability Impact, A	None

In order for a score to be calculated for the Temporal or Environmental metric groups, the Base Metric group must first be completed. The Temporal and Environmental metric values than modify the Base Metric results to provide an overall score.

CVSS Reports

The ranges of scores and the corresponding qualitative meaning is shown in the table.

Rating	CVSS Score
None	0
Low	0.1 – 3.9
Medium	4.0 – 6.9
High	7.0 – 8.9
Critical	9.0 – 10.0

Frequently, the Base and Temporal metric group scores will be supplied to customers by the application or security vendor in whose product the vulnerability has been discovered. The affected organization completes the environmental metric group to tailor the vendor-supplied scoring to the local context.

The resulting score serves to guide the affected organization in the allocation of resources to address the vulnerability. The higher the severity rating, the greater the potential impact of an exploit and the greater the urgency in addressing the vulnerability. While not as precise as the numeric CVSS scores, the qualitative labels are very useful for communicating with stakeholders who are unable to relate to the numeric scores.

In general, any vulnerability that exceeds 3.9 should be addressed. The higher the rating level, the greater the urgency for remediation.

Other Vulnerability Information Sources

There are other important vulnerability information sources. These work together with the CVSS to provide a comprehensive assessment of vulnerability severity. There are two systems that operate in the United States:

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
This is a dictionary of common names, in the form of CVE identifiers, for known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The CVE identifier provides a standard way to research a reference to vulnerabilities. When a vulnerability has been identified, CVE identifiers can be used to access fixes. In addition, threat intelligence services use CVE identifiers, and they appear in various security system logs. The CVE Details website provides a linkage between CVSS scores and CVE information. It allows browsing of CVE vulnerability records by CVSS severity rating.

Search the internet for Mitre for more information on CVE as shown in the figure.

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
This utilizes CVE identifiers and supplies additional information on vulnerabilities such as CVSS threat scores, technical details, affected entities, and resources for further investigation. The database was created and is maintained by the U.S. government National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) agency.

Action Point
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Risk Management In Cybersecurity: Facts To Note

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Risk management in cybersecurity involves the selection and specification of security controls for an organization. It is part of an ongoing organization-wide information security program that involves the management of the risk to the organization or to individuals associated with the operation of a system.

A Risk Management Process

Risk is determined as the relationship between threat, vulnerability, and the nature of the organization. It first involves answering the following questions as part of a risk assessment:

Who are the threat actors who want to attack us?
What vulnerabilities can threat actors exploit?
How would we be affected by attacks?
What is the likelihood that different attacks will occur?

NIST Special Publication 800-30 describes risk assessment as:
…the process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing information security risks. Assessing risk requires the careful analysis of threat and vulnerability information to determine the extent to which circumstances or events could adversely impact an organization and the likelihood that such circumstances or events will occur.

The full publication is available for download from NIST.
A mandatory activity in risk assessment is the identification of threats and vulnerabilities and the matching of threats with vulnerabilities in what is often called threat-vulnerability (T-V) pairing. The T-V pairs can then be used as a baseline to indicate risk before security controls are implemented. This baseline can then be compared to ongoing risk assessments as a means of evaluating risk management effectiveness. This part of risk assessment is referred to as determining the inherent risk profile of an organization.

After the risks are identified, they may be scored or weighted as a way of prioritizing risk reduction strategies. For example, vulnerabilities that are found to have corresponded with multiple threats can receive higher ratings. In addition, T-V pairs that map to the greatest institutional impact will also receive higher weightings.

The table lists the four potential ways to respond to risks that have been identified, based on there weightings or scores.

Risk	Description
Risk avoidance	Stop performing the activities that create risk. It is possible that as a result of a risk assessment, it is determined that the risk involved in an activity outweighs the benefit of the activity to the organization. If this is found to be true, than it may be determined that the activity should be discontinued.
Risk reduction	Decrease the risk by taking measures to reduce vulnerability. This involves implementing management approaches discussed earlier in this chapter. For example, if an organization uses server operating systems that are frequently targeted by threat actors, risk can be reduced through ensuring that the servers are patched as soon as vulnerabilities have been identified.
Risk sharing	Shift some of the risks to other parties. For example, a risk-sharing technique might be to outsource some aspects of security operations to third parties. Hiring security as a service (SECaaS) CSIRT to perform security monitoring is an example. Another example is to buy insurance that will help to mitigate some of the financial losses due to a security incident.
Risk-retention	Accept the risk and it’s consequences. This strategy is acceptable for risks that have a low potential impact and relatively high cost of mitigation or reduction. Other risks that may be retained are those that are so dramatic that they cannot really be avoided, reduced, or shared.

Vulnerability Management

According to NIST, vulnerability management is a security practice that is designed to proactively prevent the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities that exist within an organization. The expected result is to reduce the time and money spent dealing with vulnerabilities and the exploitation of those vulnerabilities.

Proactively managing vulnerabilities of systems will reduce or eliminate the potential for exploitation and involve considerably less time and effort than responding after exploitation has occurred.
Vulnerability management requires a robust means of identifying vulnerabilities based on vendor security bulletins and other information systems such as CVE.

Security personnel must be competent in assessing the impact, if any, of vulnerability information they have received. Solutions should be identified with effective means of implementing and assessing the unanticipated consequences of implemented solutions. Finally, the solution should be tested to verify that the vulnerability has been eliminated.

Vulnerability Management Life Cycle

Inventory all assets across the network and identify host details, including operating systems and open services, to identify vulnerabilities. Develop a network baseline. Identify security vulnerabilities on a regular automated schedule.

Asset Management

Asset management involves the implementation of systems that track the location and configuration of networked devices and software across an enterprise. As part of any security management plan, organizations must know what equipment accesses the network, where that equipment is within the enterprise and logically on the network, and what software and data those systems store or can access.

Asset management not only tracks corporate assets and other authorized devices but also can be used to identify devices that are not authorized on the network.

NIST specifies in publication NISTIR 8011 Volume 2, the detailed records that should be kept for each relevant device. NIST describes potential techniques and tools for operationalizing an asset management process:

Automated discovery and inventory of the actual state of devices
Articulation of the desired state for those devices using policies, plans, and procedures in the organization’s information security plan
Identification of non-compliant authorized assets
Remediation or acceptance of device state, possible iteration of desired state definition
Repeat the process at regular intervals, or ongoing

Mobile Device Management

Mobile device management (MDM), especially in the age of BYOD, presents special challenges to asset management. Mobile devices cannot be physically controlled on the premises of an organization. They can be lost, stolen, or tampered with, putting data and network access at risk. Part of an MDM plan is acting when devices leave the custody of the responsible party.

Measures that can be taken include disabling the lost device, encrypting the data on the device, and enhancing device access with more robust authentication measures.

Due to the diversity of mobile devices, it is possible that some devices that will be used on the network are inherently less secure than others. Network administrators should assume that all mobile devices are untrusted until they have been properly secured by the organization.

MDM systems, such as Cisco Meraki Systems Manager, shown in the figure, allow security personnel to configure, monitor and update a very diverse set of mobile clients from the cloud.

Configuration Management

Configuration management addresses the inventory and control of hardware and software configurations of systems. Secure device configurations reduce security risk. For example, an organization provides many computers and laptops to it’s workers. This enlarges the attack surface for the organization, because each system may be vulnerable to exploits.

To manage this, the organization may create baseline software images and hardware configurations for each type of machine. These images may include a basic package of required software, endpoint security software, and customized security policies that control user access to aspects of the system configuration that could be made vulnerable. Hardware configurations may specify the permitted types of network interfaces and the permitted types of external storage.

Configuration management extends to the software and hardware configuration of networking devices and servers as well. As defined by NIST, configuration management:

Comprises a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of products and systems, through control of the processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems.
NIST Special Publication 800-128 on configuration management for network security is available for download from NIST.

For internetworking devices, software tools are available that will backup configurations, detect changes in configuration files, and enable bulk change of configurations across a number of devices.

With the advent of cloud data centres and virtualization, the management of numerous servers presents special challenges. Tools like Puppet, Chef, Ansible, and SaltStack enable efficient management of servers that are used in cloud-based computing.

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Information Security Management System: Facts To Note

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An Information Security Management System (ISMS) consists of a management framework through which an organization identifies, analyzes, and addresses information security risks.

ISMSs are not based on servers or security devices. Instead, an ISMS consists of a set of practices that are systematically applied by an organization to ensure continuous improvement in information security. ISMSs provide conceptual models that guide organizations in planning, implementing, governing, and evaluating information security programs.

ISMSs are a natural extension of the use of popular business models, such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT), into the realm of cybersecurity.
An ISMS is a systematic, multi-layered approach to cybersecurity. The approach includes people, processes, technologies, and the cultures in which they interact in a process of risk management.An ISMS often incorporates the “plan-do-check-act” framework, known as the Deming cycle, from TQM. It is seen as an elaboration on the process component of the People-Process-Technology-Culture model of organizational capability, as shown in the figure.

A General Model for Organizational Capability

ISO-27001

ISO is the International Organization for Standardization. ISO’s voluntary standards are internationally accepted and facilitate business conducted between nations.
ISO partnered with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to develop the ISO/IEC 27000 series of specifications for ISMSs, as shown in the table.

Standard	Description
ISO/IEC 27000	Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary – Introduction to the standards family, overview of ISMS, essential vocabulary.
ISO/IEC 27001	Information security management systems– Requirements – Provides an overview of ISMS and the essentials of ISMS processes and procedures.
ISO/IEC 27003	Information security management system implementation guidance – Critical factors necessary for successful design and implementation of ISMS.
ISO/IEC 27004	Information security management – Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation – Discussion of metrics and measurement procedures to assess the effectiveness of ISMS implementation.
ISO/IEC 27005	Information security risk management – Supports the implementation of ISMS based on a risk-centred management approach.

The ISO 27001 certification is a global, industry-wide specification for an ISMS. The figure illustrates the relationship of actions stipulated by the standard with the plan-do-check-act cycle.

ISO 27001 ISMS Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle

Understand relevant business objectives
Define scope of activities
Access and manage support
Assess and define risk
Perform asset management and vulnerability assessment

ISO-27001 certification means an organization’s security policies and procedures have been independently verified to provide a systematic and proactive approach for effectively managing security risks to confidential customer information.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST is very effective in the area of cybersecurity, as we have seen in this module. More NIST standards will be discussed later in the course.
NIST has also developed the Cybersecurity framework which is similar to the ISO/IEC 27000 standards.

The NIST framework is a set of standards designed to integrate existing standards, guidelines, and practices to help better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk. The framework was first issued in February 2014 and continues to undergo development.

The framework core consists of a set of activities suggested to achieve specific cybersecurity outcomes, and references examples of guidance to achieve those outcomes. The core functions, which are defined in the table, are split into major categories and subcategories.

Core Function	Description
IDENTIFY	Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.
PROTECT	Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services.
DETECT	Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event.
RESPOND	Develop and implement the appropriate activities to act on a detected cybersecurity event.
RECOVER	Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event.

The major categories provide an understanding of the types of activities and outcomes related to each function, as shown in the next table.

Core Function	Outcome Categories
IDENTIFY	Asset Management Business Environment Governance Risk Assessment Risk Management Strategy
PROTECT	Identity Management and Access Control Information Protection Processes and Procedures Maintenance Protective Technology
DETECT	Anomalies and Events Security Continuous Monitoring Detection Processes
RESPOND	Response Planning Communications Analysis Mitigation Improvements
RECOVER	Recovery Planning Improvements Communications

Organizations of many types are using the Framework in a number of ways. Many have found it helpful in raising awareness and communicating with stakeholders within their organization, including executive leadership. The Framework is also improving communications across organizations, allowing cybersecurity expectations to be shared with business partners, suppliers, and among sectors. By mapping the Framework to current cybersecurity management approaches, organizations are learning and showing how they match up with the Framework’s standards, guidelines, and best practices. Some parties are using the Framework to reconcile internal policy with legislation, regulation, and industry best practice. The Framework also is being used as a strategic planning tool to assess risks and current practices.

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CRMNUGGETS is committed to fact-checking in a fair, transparent and non-partisan manner. Therefore, if you’ve found an error in any of our reports, be it factual, editorial, or an outdated post, please contact us to tell us about it.

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Ways Of Monitoring Syslog And NTP Protocols Effectively

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Various protocols that commonly appear on networks have features that make them of special interest in security monitoring. For example, Syslog and Network Time Protocol (NTP) are essential to the work of the cybersecurity analyst. In this article, I will be talking about how to use Syslog and NTP protocols effectively.

The Syslog standard is used for logging event messages from network devices and endpoints, as shown in the figure. The standard allows for a system-neutral means of transmitting, storing, and analyzing messages. Many types of devices from many different vendors can use Syslog to send log entries to central servers that run a Syslog daemon. This centralization of log collection helps to make security monitoring practical. Servers that run Syslog typically listen on UDP port 514.

Because Syslog is so important to security monitoring, Syslog servers may be a target for threat actors. Some exploits, such as those involving data exfiltration, can take a long time to complete due to the very slow ways in which data is secretly stolen from the network. Some attackers may try to hide the fact that exfiltration is occurring.

They attack Syslog servers that contain the information that could lead to detection of the exploit. Hackers may attempt to block the tractor of data from Syslog clients to servers, tamper with or destroy log data, or tamper with the software that creates and transmits log messages. The next generation (ng) Syslog implementation, known as Syslog-ng, offers enhancements that can help prevent some of the exploits that target Syslog.

Search the internet for more information about Syslog-ng..

NTP

Syslog messages are usually timestamped. This allows messages from different sources to be organized by time to provide a view of network communication processes. Because the messages can come from many devices, it is important that the devices share a consistent time clock. One way that this can be achieved is for the devices to use Network Time Protocol (NTP).

NTP uses a hierarchy of authoritative time sources to share time information between devices on the network, as shown in the figure. In this way, device messages that share consistent time information can be submitted to the syslog server. NTP operates on UDP port 123.

Because events that are connected to an exploit can leave traces across every network device on there path to the target system, timestamps are essential for detection. Threat actors may attempt to attack the NTP infrastructure in order to corrupt time information used to correlate logged network events.
This can serve to obfuscate traces of ongoing exploits.

In addition, threat actors have been known to use NTP systems to direct DDoS attacks through vulnerabilities in client or server software. While these attacks do not necessarily result in corrupted security monitoring data, they can disrupt network availability.

DNS

Domain Name Service (DNS) is used by millions of people daily. Because of this, many organizations have less stringent policies in place to protect against DNS-based threats than they have to protect against other types of exploits. Attackers have recognized this and commonly encapsulate different network protocols within DNS to evade security devices.
DNS is now used by many types of malware. Some varieties of malware use DNS to communicate with command-and-control (CnC) servers and to exfiltrate data in traffic disguised as normal DNS queries. Various types of encoding, such as Base64, 8-bit binary, and Hex can be used to camouflage the data and evade basic data loss prevention (DLP) measures.

For example, malware could encode stolen data as the subdomain portion of a DNS lookup for a domain where the nameserver is under control of an attacker. A DNS lookup for ‘long-string-of-exfiltrated-data.example.com’ would be forwarded to the nameserver of example.com, which would record ‘long-string-of-exfiltrated-data’ and reply back to the malware with a coded response.

The exfiltrated data is the encoded text shown in the box. The threat actor collects this encoded data, decodes and combines it, and now has access to an entire data file, such as a username/password database.

It is likely that the subdomain part of such requests would be much longer than usual requests. Cyber analysts can use the distribution of the lengths of subdomains within DNS requests to construct a mathematical model that describes normality.

They can than use this to compare there observations and identify abuse of the DNS query process. For example, it would not be normal to see a host on your network sending a query to aW4gcGxhY2UgdG8gcHJvdGVjdC.example.com.

DNS queries for randomly generated domain names, or extremely long random-appearing subdomains, should be considered suspicious, especially if there occurrence spikes dramatically on the network. DNS proxy logs can be analyzed to detect these conditions. Alternatively, services such as the Cisco Umbrella passive DNS service can be used to block requests to suspected CnC and exploit domains.

HTTP and HTTPS

Hypertext Tractor Protocol (HTTP) is the backbone protocol of the World Wide Web. However, all information carried in HTTP is transmitted in plaintext from the source computer to the destination on the internet. HTTP does not protect data from alteration or interception by malicious parties, which is a serious threat to privacy, identity, and information security. All browsing activity should be considered to be at risk.

A common exploit of HTTP is called iFrame (inline frame) injection. Most web-based threats consist of malware scripts that have been planted on webservers. These webservers than direct browsers to infected servers by loading iframes. In iFrame injection, a threat actor compromises a webserver and plants malicious code which creates an invisible iFrame on a commonly visited webpage.

When the iFrame loads, malware is downloaded, frequently from a different URL than the webpage that contains the iFrame code. Network security services, such as Cisco Web Reputation filtering, can detect when a website attempts to send content from an untrusted website to the host, even when sent from an iFrame.

HTTP iFrame Injection Exploit

To address the alteration or interception of confidential data, many commercial organizations have adopted HTTPS or implemented HTTPS-only policies to protect visitors to there websites and services.

HTTPS adds a layer of encryption to the HTTP protocol by using secure socket layer (SSL), as shown in the figure. This makes the HTTP data unreadable as it leaves the source computer until it reaches the server. Note that HTTPS is not a mechanism for web server security. It only secures HTTP protocol traffic while it is in transit.

Unfortunately, the encrypted HTTPS traffic complicates network security monitoring. Some security devices include SSL decryption and inspection; however, this can present processing and privacy issues. In addition, HTTPS adds complexity to packet captures due to the additional messaging involved in establishing the encrypted connection. This process is summarized in the figure and represents additional overhead on top of HTTP.

HTTPS Transactions

Client browser requests a secure page with https://Web server sends it’s public key with it’s certificate Client browser creates a symmetric key and sends it to the server.

Web server uses the symmetric key to encrypt the page and sends it to the clientWeb server decrypts the symmetric key using it’s private key Client browser ensures that the certificate is unexpired or unrevoked and was issued by a trusted partyClient browser uses the symmetric key to decrypt the page and display the information to the user

Email Protocols

Email protocols such as SMTP, POP3, and IMAP can be used by threat actors to spread malware, exfiltrate data, or provide channels to malware CnC servers.

SMTP sends data from a host to a mail server and between mail servers. Like DNS and HTTP, it is a common protocol to see leaving the network. Because there is so much SMTP traffic, it is not always monitored.

However, SMTP has been used in the past by malware to exfiltrate data from the network. In the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures, one of the exploits used SMTP to exfiltrate user details from compromised hosts to CnC servers.

This information may have been used to help develop exploits of secured resources within the Sony Pictures network. Security monitoring could reveal this type of traffic based on features of the email message.

IMAP and POP3 are used to download email messages from a mail server to the host computer. For this reason, they are the application protocols that are responsible for bringing malware to the host. Security monitoring can identify when a malware attachment entered the network and which host it first infected. Retrospective analysis can than track the behaviour of the malware from that point forward.

In this way, the malware behaviour can better be understood and the threat identified. Security monitoring tools may also allow recovery of infected file attachments for submission to malware sandboxes for analysis.

Email Protocol Threats

ICMP

ICMP has many legitimate uses, however, ICMP functionality has also been used to craft a number of types of exploits. ICMP can be used to identify hosts on a network, the structure of a network, and determine the operating systems at use on the network. It can also be used as a vehicle for various types of DoS attacks.

ICMP can also be used for data exfiltration. Because of the concern that ICMP can be used to surveil or deny service from outside of the network, ICMP traffic from inside the network is sometimes overlooked. However, some varieties of malware use crafted ICMP packets to tractor files from infected hosts to threat actors using this method, which is known as ICMP tunnelling.

Search the internet for a detailed explanation of the well-known LOKI exploit.
Note: This site might be blocked by your institution’s firewall.
A number of tools exist for crafting tunnels. Search the internet for Ping Tunnel to explore one such tool.

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Understanding Access Control List In Cybersecurity

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Many technologies and protocols can have impacts on security monitoring. Access Control Lists (ACLs) are among these technologies. ACLs can give a false sense of security if they are overly relied upon. ACLs, and packet filtering in general, are technologies that contribute to an evolving set of network security protections.

The figure illustrates the use of ACLs to permit only specific types of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) traffic. The server at 192.168.1.10 is part of the inside network and is allowed to send ping requests to the outside host at 209.165.201.3. The outside host’s return ICMP traffic is allowed if it is an ICMP reply, source quench (tells the source to reduce the pace of traffic), or any ICMP unreachable message.

All other ICMP traffic types are denied. For example, the outside host cannot initiate a ping request to the inside host. The outbound ACL is allowing ICMP messages that report various problems. This will allow ICMP tunnelling and data exfiltration.

Attackers can determine which IP addresses, protocols, and ports are allowed by ACLs. This can be done either by port scanning, penetration testing or through other forms of reconnaissance. Attackers can craft packets that use spoofed source IP addresses. Applications can establish connections on arbitrary ports. Other features of protocol traffic can also be manipulated, such as the established flag in TCP segments. Rules cannot be anticipated and configured for all emerging packet manipulation techniques.

In order to detect and react to packet manipulation, more sophisticated behaviour and context-based measures need to be taken. Cisco Next-Generation firewalls, Advanced Malware Protection (AMP), and email and web content appliances are able to address the shortcomings of rule-based security measures.

Mitigating ICMP Abuse

NAT and PAT

Network Address Translation (NAT) and Port Address Translation (PAT) can complicate security monitoring. Multiple IP addresses are mapped to one or more public addresses that are visible on the internet, hiding the individual IP addresses that are inside the network (inside addresses).

The figure illustrates the relationship between internal and external addresses that are used as source addresses (SA) and destination addresses (DA). These internal and external addresses are in a network that is using NAT to communicate with a destination on the internet. If PAT is in effect, and all IP addresses leaving the network use the 209.165.200.226 inside global address for traffic to the internet, it could be difficult to log the specific inside device that is requesting and receiving the traffic when it enters the network.

This problem can be especially relevant with NetFlow data. NetFlow flows are unidirectional and are defined by the addresses and ports that they share. NAT will essentially break a flow that passes a NAT gateway, making flow information beyond that point unavailable. Cisco offers security products that will “stitch” flows together even if the IP addresses have been replaced by NAT.

Network Address Translation

Encryption, Encapsulation, and Tunneling

As mentioned with HTTPS, encryption can present challenges to security monitoring by making packet details unreadable. Encryption is part of VPN technologies. In VPNs, a commonplace protocol like IP, is used to carry encrypted traffic. The encrypted traffic essentially establishes a virtual point-to-point connection between networks over public facilities. Encryption makes the traffic unreadable to any other devices but the VPN endpoints.

Similar technology can be used to create a virtual point-to-point connection between an internal host and threat actor devices. Malware can establish an encrypted tunnel that rides on a common and trusted protocol, and use it to exfiltrate data from the network. A similar method of data exfiltration was discussed previously for DNS.

Peer-to-Peer Networking and Tor

In peer-to-peer (P2P) networking, shown in the figure, hosts can operate in both client and server roles. Three types of P2P applications exist file-sharing, processor sharing, and instant messaging. In file-sharing P2P, files on a participating machine are shared with members of the P2P network. Examples of this are the once-popular Napster and Gnutella. Bitcoin is a P2P operation that involves the sharing of a distributed database, or ledger, that records Bitcoin balances and transactions. BitTorrent is a P2P file-sharing network.

Any time that unknown users are provided access to network resources, security is a concern. File-sharing P2P applications should not be allowed on corporate networks. P2P network activity can circumvent firewall protections and is a common vector for the spread of malware.

P2P is inherently dynamic. It can operate by connecting to numerous destination IP addresses, and it can also use dynamic port numbering. Shared files are often infected with malware, and threat actors can position their malware on P2P clients for distribution to other users.

Processor sharing P2P networks donate processor cycles to distributed computational tasks. Cancer research, searching for extraterrestrials, and scientific research use donated processor cycles to distribute computational tasks.

Instant messaging (IM) is also considered to be a P2P application. IM has legitimate value within organizations that have geographically distributed project teams. In this case, specialized IM applications are available, such as the Webex Teams platform, which is more secure than IM uses public servers.

P2P

Tor is a software platform and network of P2P hosts that function as internet routers on the Tor network. The Tor network allows users to browse the internet anonymously. Users access the Tor network by using a special browser.

When a browsing session is begun, the browser constructs a layered end-to-end path across the Tor server network that is encrypted, as shown in the figure. Each encrypted layer is “peeled away” like the layers of an onion (hence “onion routing”) as the traffic traverses a Tor relay.

The layers contain encrypted next-hop information that can only be read by the router that needs to read the information. In this way, no single device knows the entire path to the destination, and routing information is readable only by the device that requires it. Finally, at the end of the Tor path, the traffic reaches its internet destination. When traffic is returned to the source, an encrypted layered path is again constructed.

Tor presents a number of challenges to cybersecurity analysts. First, Tor is widely used by criminal organizations on the “dark net.” In addition, Tor has been used as a communications channel for malware CnC. Because the destination IP address of Tor traffic is obfuscated by encryption, with only the next-hop Tor node known, Tor traffic avoids blacklists that have been configured on security devices.

Load Balancing

Load balancing involves the distribution of traffic between devices or network paths to prevent overwhelming network resources with too much traffic. If redundant resources exist, a load balancing algorithm or device will work to distribute traffic between those resources, as shown in the figure.

One way this is done on the internet is through various techniques that use DNS to send traffic to resources that have the same domain name but multiple IP addresses. In some cases, the distribution may be to servers that are distributed geographically.

This can result in a single internet transaction being represented by multiple IP addresses on the incoming packets. This may cause suspicious features to appear in packet captures.

In addition, some load balancing manager (LBM) devices use probes to test for the performance of different paths and the health of different devices. For example, an LBM may send probes to the different servers that it is load balancing traffic to in order to detect that the servers are operating.

This is done to avoid sending traffic to a resource that is not available. These probes can appear to be suspicious traffic if the cybersecurity analyst is not aware that this traffic is part of the operation of the LBM.

Action Point
I know you might agree with some of the points that I have raised in this article. You might not agree with some of the issues raised. Let me know your views about the topic discussed. We will appreciate it if you can drop your comment. Thanks in anticipation.

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7 Types Of Security Data In Cybersecurity

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Alert data consists of messages generated by intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) or intrusion detection systems (IDSs) in response to traffic that violates a rule or matches the signature of a known exploit. A network IDS (NIDS), such as Snort, comes configured with rules for known exploits.

Alerts are generated by Snort and are made readable and searchable by the Sguil and Squert applications, which are part of the Security Onion suite of NSM tools. In this article, I will be talking about security data in cybersecurity.

A testing site that is used to determine if Snort is operating is the tesmyids site. Search for it on the internet. It consists of a single webpage that displays only the following text uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). If Snort is operating correctly and a host visits this site, a signature will be matched and an alert will be triggered. This is an easy and harmless way to verify that the NIDS is running.
The Snort rule that is triggered is:

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"GPL ATTACK\_RESPONSE id check returned root"; content:"uid=0|28|root|29|"; fast\_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2100498; rev:8;)

This rule generates an alert if any IP address in the network receives data from an external source that contains content with text matching the pattern of uid=0(root). The alert contains the message GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE id check returned root. The ID of the Snort rule that was triggered is 2100498.
The highlighted line in the figure displays a Sguil alert that was generated by visiting the testmyids website. The Snort rule and the packet data for the content received from the testmyvids webpage is displayed in the lower right-hand area of the Sguil interface.

Sguil Console Showing Test Alert from Snort IDS

Session and Transaction Data

Session data is a record of a conversation between two network endpoints, which are often a client and a server. The server could be inside the enterprise network or at a location accessed over the internet. Session data is data about the session, not the data retrieved and used by the client.

Session data will include identifying information such as the five tuples of source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers, and the IP code for the protocol in use. Data about the session typically includes a session ID, the amount of data transferred by source and destination, and information related to the duration of the session.

Zeek, formerly Bro, is a network security monitoring tool you will use in labs later in the course. The figure shows a partial output for three HTTP sessions from a Zeek connection log. Explanations of the fields are shown below the figure.

Zeek Session Data – Partial Contents

12345678910111213

ts: session start timestamp
uid: unique session ID
id.orig_h: IP address of host that originated the session (source address)
id.orig_p: protocol port for the originating host (source port)
id.resp_h: IP address of host responding to the originating host (destination address)
id.resp_p: protocol of responding host (destination port)
proto: transport layer protocol for session
service: application layer protocol
duration: duration of the session
orig_bytes: bytes from originating host
resp_bytes: bytes from responding host
orig_packets: packets from the originating host
resp_packets: packets from responding host

Transaction data consists of the messages that are exchanged during network sessions. These transactions can be viewed in packet capture transcripts. Device logs kept by servers also contain information about the transactions that occur between clients and servers. For example, a session might include the downloading of content from a web server, as shown in the figure.

The transactions that represent the requests and replies would be logged in an access log on the server or by a NIDS like Zeek. The session is all traffic involved in making up the request, the transaction is the request itself.

Transaction Data

GET /home/index.html HTTP/1.1Host: www.example.comContent-Type: text/plain Tractor-Encoding: chunkedMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:53.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2015 23:59:59 GMT Content-Type: text/plain<text returned>192.168.1.10 – anyUser [10/Oct/2015:13:55:36 -0500] “GET /index.html HTTP/1.1” 200 326

Transaction data record as a web server access log entry.

Full Packet Captures

Full packet captures are the most detailed network data that is generally collected. Because of the amount of detail, they are also the most storage and retrieval intensive types of data used in NSM. Full packet captures contain not only data about network conversations, like session data.

Full packet captures also contain the actual contents of the conversations. Full packet captures contain the text of email messages, the HTML in webpages, and the files that enter or leave the network. Extracted content can be recovered from full packet captures and analyzed for malware or user behaviour that violates business and security policies.

The familiar tool Wireshark is very popular for viewing full packet captures and accessing the data associated with network conversations.
The figure illustrates the interface for the Network Analysis Monitor component of the Cisco Prime Infrastructure system, which, like Wireshark, can display full packet captures.

Cisco Prime Network Analysis Module – Full Packet Capture

Statistical Data

Like session data, statistical data is about network traffic. Statistical data is created through the analysis of other forms of network data. Conclusions can be made that describe or predict network behaviour from this analysis. Statistical characteristics of normal network behaviour can be compared to current network traffic in an effort to detect anomalies.

Statistics can be used to characterize normal amounts of variation in network traffic patterns in order to identify network conditions that are significantly outside of those ranges. Statistically, significant differences should raise alarms and prompt investigation.

Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) and Network Behavior Anomaly Detection (NBAD) are approaches to network security monitoring that use advanced analytical techniques to analyze NetFlow or Internet Protocol Flow Information Export (IPFIX) network telemetry data. Techniques such as predictive analytics and artificial intelligence perform advanced analyses of detailed session data to detect potential security incidents.

Note: IPFIX is the IETF standard version of Cisco NetFlow version 9.
An example of an NSM tool that utilizes statistical analysis is Cisco Cognitive Threat Analytics. It is able to find a malicious activity that has bypassed security controls or entered the network through unmonitored channels (including removable media) and is operating inside an organization’s environment.

Cognitive Threat Analytics is a cloud-based product that uses machine learning and statistical modelling of networks. It creates a baseline of the traffic in a network and identifies anomalies. It analyzes user and device behaviour, and web traffic, to discover command-and-control communications, data exfiltration, and potentially unwanted applications operating in the infrastructure. The figure illustrates an architecture for Cisco Cognitive Threat Analytics.

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End Device Logs In Cybersecurity: The Various Types

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As previously discussed, host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) run on individual hosts. HIDS not only detects intrusions but in the form of host-based firewalls, which can also prevent intrusion. This software creates logs and stores them on the host. This can make it difficult to get a view of what is happening on hosts in the enterprise, so many host-based protections have a way to submit logs to centralized log management servers. In this way, the logs can be searched from a central location using NSM tools.

HIDS systems can use agents to submit logs to management servers. OSSEC, a popular open-source HIDS, includes a robust log collection and analysis functionality. Search OSSEC on the internet to learn more. Microsoft Windows includes several methods for automated host log collection and analysis. Tripwire offers a HIDS for Linux that includes similar functionality. All can scale to larger enterprises.
Microsoft Windows host logs are visible locally through Event Viewer. Event Viewer keeps four types of logs:

Application logs – These contain events logged by various applications.
System logs – These include events regarding the operation of drivers, processes, and hardware.
Setup logs – These record information about the installation of software, including Windows updates.
Security logs – These record events related to security, such as logon attempts and operations related to file or object management and access.
Command-line logs – Attackers who have gained access to a system, and some types of malware, execute commands from the command-line interface (CLI) rather than a GUI. Logging command line execution will provide visibility into this type of incident.

Various logs can have different event types. Security logs consist only of audit success or failure messages. On Windows computers, security logging is carried out by the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), which is also responsible for enforcing security policies on a Windows host. LSASS runs as lsass.exe. It is frequently faked by malware.

It should be running from the Windows System32 directory. If a file with this name, or a camouflaged name, such as 1sass.exe, is running or running from another directory, it could be malware.

Windows Events are identified by ID numbers and brief descriptions. An encyclopedia of security event IDs, some with additional details, is available from Ultimate Windows Security on the web.

The table explains the meaning of the five Windows host log event types.

Event Type	Description
Error	An error is an event that indicates a significant problem such as loss of data or loss of functionality. For example, if a service fails to load during startup, an error event is logged.
Warning	A Warning is an event that is not necessarily significant but may indicate a possible future problem. For example, when disk space is low, a warning event is logged. If an application can recover from an event without loss of functionality or data, it can generally classify the event as a warning event.
Information	An information event describes the successful operation of an application, driver, or service. For example, when a network driver loads successfully, it may be appropriate to log an information event. Note that it is generally inappropriate for a desktop application to log an event each time it starts.
Success Audit	A success audit is an event that records an audited security access attempt that is successful. For example, a user’s successful attempt to log on to the system is logged as a success audit event.
Failure Audit	A failure audit is an event that records an audited security access attempt that fails. For example, if a user tries to access a network drive and fails, the attempt is logged as a failure audit event.

Syslog

Syslog includes specifications for message formats, a client-server application structure, and network protocol. Many different types of network devices can be configured to use the Syslog standard to log events to centralized syslog servers.
Syslog is a client/server protocol. Syslog was defined within the Syslog working group of the IETF (RFC 5424) and is supported by a wide variety of devices and receivers across multiple platforms.

The Syslog sender sends a small (less than 1KB) text message to the Syslog receiver. The Syslog receiver is commonly called “syslogd,” “Syslog daemon,” or “Syslog server.” Syslog messages can be sent via UDP (port 514) and/or TCP (typically, port 5000). While there are some exceptions, such as SSL wrappers, this data is typically sent in plaintext over the network.

The full format of a Syslog message that is seen on the network has three distinct parts, as shown in the figure.

PRI (priority)
HEADER
MSG (message text)

The PRI consists of two elements, the Facility and Severity of the message, which are both integer values. The Facility consists of broad categories of sources that generated the message, such as the system, process, or application. The Facility value can be used by logging servers to direct the message to the appropriate log file. The Severity is a value from 0-7 that defines the severity of the message.

Note: Facility codes between 15 and 23 (local0-local7) are not assigned a keyword or name. They can be assigned to different meanings depending on the user context. Also, various operating systems have been found to utilize both Facilities 9 and 15 for clock messages.

The HEADER section of the message contains the timestamp in MMM DD HH:MM:SS format. If the timestamp is preceded by the period (.) or asterisk (*) symbols, a problem is indicated with NTP. The HEADER section also includes the hostname or IP address of the device that is the source of the message.

The MSG portion contains the meaning of the Syslog message. This can vary between device manufacturers and can be customized. Therefore, this portion of the message is the most meaningful and useful to the cybersecurity analyst.

Server Logs

Server logs are an essential source of data for network security monitoring. Network application servers such as email and web servers keep access and error logs. DNS proxy server logs which document all the DNS queries and responses that occur on the network are especially important.

DNS proxy logs are useful for identifying hosts that may have visited dangerous websites and for identifying DNS data exfiltration and connections to malware command-and-control servers. Many UNIX and Linux servers use Syslog. Others may use proprietary logging. The contents of log file events depend on the type of server.
Two important log files to be familiar with are the Apache webserver access logs and Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) access logs. Examples of each are shown below.

Apache Access Log

203.0.113.127 – dsmith [10/Oct/2016:10:26:57 - 0500] "GET /logo_sm.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 2254 "http://www.example.com/links.html" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0"

IIS Access Log

6/14/2016, 16:22:43, 203.0.113.24, -, W3SVC2, WEB3, 198.51.100.10, 80, GET, /home.htm, -, 200, 0, 15321, 159, 15, HTTP/1.1, Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows Phone OS 7.5; Trident/5.0; IEMobile/9.0), -, http://www.example.com

SIEM and Log Collection

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) technology is used in many organizations to provide real-time reporting and long-term analysis of security events, as shown in the figure.

SIEM combines the essential functions of security event management (SEM) and security information management (SIM) tools to provide a comprehensive view of the enterprise network using the following functions:

Log collection – Event records from sources throughout the organization provide important forensic information and help to address compliance reporting requirements.
Normalization – This maps log messages from different systems into a common data model, enabling the organization to connect and analyze related events, even if they are initially logged in different source formats.
Correlation – This links logs and events from disparate systems or applications, speeding detection of and reaction to security threats.
Aggregation – This reduces the volume of event data by consolidating duplicate event records.
Reporting – This presents the correlated, aggregated event data in real-time monitoring and long-term summaries, including graphical interactive dashboards.
Compliance – This is reporting to satisfy the requirements of various compliance regulations.

A popular SIEM is Splunk, which is made by a Cisco partner. The figure shows a Splunk Threat Dashboard. Splunk is widely used in SOCs. Another popular SIEM solution is Security Onion with ELK, which consists of the integrated Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana applications. Security Onion includes other open-source network security monitoring tools.

Splunk Threat Dashboard

As we know, security orchestration, automation, and response (SOAR) takes SIEM and goes beyond into automating security response workflows and facilitating incidence response. Because of the importance of network security, numerous companies have brought excellent products to the security tools market.

However, these tools lack compatibility and require monitoring multiple independent product dashboards in order to process the many alerts that they generate. Because of the lack of cybersecurity professionals to monitor and analyze the large volume of security data, it is important that tools from multiple vendors can be integrated into a single platform.

Integrated security platforms go beyond SIEM and SOAR to unify multiple security technologies, processes, and people into a unified team whose components build on rather than impede each other. Security platforms such as Cisco SecureX, Fortinet Security Fabric, and Paloalto Networks Cortex XDR promise to address network security monitoring complexity by integrating multiple functions and data sources into a single platform that will greatly enhance alert accuracy while offering a robust defence.

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Network Logs In Cybersecurity: Facts To Note

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The tcpdump command-line tool is a very popular packet analyzer. It can display packet captures in real-time or write packet captures to a file. It captures detailed packet protocol and content data. Wireshark is a GUI built on tcpdump functionality.

The structure of tcpdump captures varies depending on the protocol captured and the fields requested.

NetFlow

NetFlow is a protocol that was developed by Cisco as a tool for network troubleshooting and session-based accounting. NetFlow efficiently provides an important set of services for IP applications, including network traffic accounting, usage-based network billing, network planning, security, Denial-of-Service monitoring capabilities, and network monitoring. NetFlow provides valuable information about network users and applications, peak usage times, and traffic routing.

NetFlow does not do a full packet capture or capture the actual content in the packet. NetFlow records information about the packet flow including metadata. Cisco developed NetFlow and then allowed it to be used as a basis for an IETF standard called IPFIX. IPFIX is based on Cisco NetFlow Version 9.

NetFlow information can be viewed with tools such as the nfdump. Similar to tcpdump, nfdump provides a command-line utility for viewing NetFlow data from the nfcapd capture daemon, or collector. Tools exist that add GUI functionality to viewing flows. The figure shows a screen from the open-source FlowViewer tool.

FlowViewer NetFlow Session Data Dashboard

Traditionally, an IP Flow is based on a set of 5 to 7 IP packet attributes flowing in a single direction. A flow consists of all packets transmitted until the TCP conversation terminates. IP Packet attributes used by NetFlow are:

IP source address
IP destination address
Source port
Destination port
Layer 3 protocol type
Class of Service
Router or switch interface

All packets with the same source/destination IP address, source/destination ports, protocol interface and class of service are grouped into a flow, and then packets and bytes are tallied. This methodology of fingerprinting or determining a flow is scalable because a large amount of network information is condensed into a database of NetFlow information called the NetFlow cache.

All NetFlow flow records will contain the first five items in the list above, and flow start and end timestamps. The additional information that may appear is highly variable and can be configured on the NetFlow Exporter device.

Exporters are devices that can be configured to create flow records and transmit those flow records for storage on a NetFlow collector device. An example of a basic NetFlow flow record, in two different formats, is shown in the figure.

Simple NetFlow v5 Records

Date     flow start      Duration  Proto Src IP Addr:Port     Dst IP Addr:Port  Flags Tos Packets Bytes Flows2017-08-30 00:09:12.596  00.010    TCP   10.1.1.2:80      -> 13.1.1.2:8974     .AP.SF  0   62      3512   1

Traffic Contribution: 8% (3/37)Flow information:IPV4 SOURCE ADDRESS:10.1.1.2IPV4 DESTINATION ADDRESS:13.1.1.2INTERFACE INPUT:Se0/0/1TRNS SOURCE PORT:8974TRNS DESTINATION PORT:80IP TOS:0x00IP PROTOCOL:6FLOW SAMPLER ID:0FLOW DIRECTION:Inputipv4 source mask:/0ipv4 destination mask:/8counter bytes:205ipv4 next hop address:13.1.1.2tcp flags:0x1binterface output:Fa0/0counter packets:5timestamp first:00:09:12.596timestamp last:00:09:12.606ip source as:0ip destination as:0

A large number of attributes for a flow are available. The IANA registry of IPFIX entities lists several hundred, with the first 128 being the most common.

Although NetFlow was not initially conceived as a tool for network security monitoring, it is seen as a useful tool in the analysis of network security incidents. It can be used to construct a timeline of compromise, understand individual host behaviour, or track the movement of an attacker or exploit from host to host within a network. The Cisco/Lancope Stealthwatch technology enhances the use of NetFlow data for NSM.

Application Visibility and Control

The Cisco Application Visibility and Control (AVC) system, which is shown in the figure, combines multiple technologies to recognize, analyze, and control over 1000 applications. These include voice and video, email, file sharing, gaming, peer-to-peer (P2P), and cloud-based applications.

AVC uses Cisco next-generation network-based application recognition version 2 (NBAR2), also known as Next-Generation NBAR, to discover and classify the applications in use on the network. The NBAR2 application recognition engine supports over 1000 network applications.

To truly understand the importance of this technology, consider the figure. Identification of network applications by port provides very little granularity and visibility into user behaviour. However, application visibility through the identification of application signatures identifies what users are doing, whether it be teleconferencing or downloading movies to their phones.

Cisco Application Visibility and Control

High: VoIP
Medium: Browsing
Low: Streaming
Blocked: P2PManagement and Reporting ToolsApplication RecognitionIdentify applications using L3 to L7 data1000+ applications

Cloud services
Cisco WebEx
YouTube
Skype
P2P

NBAR2Metrics Collection
Collect metrics for export to management tool

Bandwidth usage
Response time
Latency
Packet loss
Jitter
P2P

IPFIXManagement and Reporting
Provision the network, collect data, and report on applications performance

Report generation
Policy management

Cisco Prime
Other 3rd Party SoftwareControl
Control application use to maximize network performance

Application prioritization
Application bandwidth enforcement

QoS

A management and reporting system, such as Cisco Prime, analyzes and presents the application analysis data into dashboard reports for use by network monitoring personnel. Application usage can also be controlled through the quality of service classification and policies based on the AVC information.

Port Monitoring vs. Application Monitoring

Content Filter Logs

Devices that provide content filterings, such as the Cisco Email Security Appliance (ESA) and the Cisco Web Security Appliance (WSA), provide a wide range of functionalities for security monitoring. Logging is available for many of these functionalities.

The ESA, for example, has more than 30 logs that can be used to monitor most aspects of email delivery, system functioning, antivirus, antispam operations, and blacklist and whitelist decisions. Most of the logs are stored in text files and can be collected on Syslog servers, or can be pushed to FTP or SCP servers. In addition, alerts regarding the functioning of the appliance itself and it’s subsystems can be monitored by email to administrators who are responsible for monitoring and operating the device.

WSA devices offer a similar depth of functioning. WSA effectively acts as a web proxy, meaning that it logs all inbound and outbound transaction information for HTTP traffic. These logs can be quite detailed and are customizable. They can be configured in a W3C compatibility format. The WSA can be configured to submit the logs to a server in various ways, including Syslog, FTP, and SCP.

Other logs that are available to the WSA include ACL decision logs, malware scan logs, and web reputation filtering logs.

The figure illustrates the “drill-down” dashboards available from Cisco content filtering devices. By clicking components of the Overview reports, more relevant details are displayed. Target searches provide the most focused information.

Logging from Cisco Devices

Cisco security devices can be configured to submit events and alerts to security management platforms using SNMP or Syslog. The figure illustrates a syslog message generated by a Cisco ASA device and a Syslog message generated by a Cisco IOS device.

Cisco Syslog Message Formats

Note that there are two meanings used for the term facility in Cisco Syslog messages. The first is the standard set of Facility values that were established by the Syslog standards. These values are used in the PRI message part of the Syslog packet to calculate the message priority. Cisco uses some of the values between 15 and 23 to identify Cisco log Facilities, depending on the platform. For example, Cisco ASA devices use Syslog Facility 20 by default, which corresponds to local4. The other Facility value is assigned by Cisco and occurs in the MSG part of the Syslog message.

Cisco devices may use slightly different Syslog message formats and may use mnemonics instead of message IDs, as shown in the figure. A dictionary of Cisco ASA Syslog messages is available on the Cisco website.

Proxy Logs

Proxy servers, such as those used for web and DNS requests, contain valuable logs that are a primary source of data for network security monitoring.

Proxy servers are devices that act as intermediaries for network clients. For example, an enterprise may configure a web proxy to handle web requests on the behalf of clients. Instead of requests for web resources being sent directly to the server from the client, the request is sent to a proxy server first. The proxy server requests the resources and returns them to the client. The proxy server generates logs of all requests and responses.

These logs can then be analyzed to determine which hosts are making the requests, whether the destinations are safe or potentially malicious, and to also gain insights into the kind of resources that have been downloaded.

Web proxies provide data that helps determine whether responses from the web were generated in response to legitimate requests or have been manipulated to appear to be responses but are in fact exploits. It is also possible to use web proxies to inspect outgoing traffic as means of data loss prevention (DLP). DLP involves scanning outgoing traffic to detect whether the data that is leaving the web contains sensitive, confidential, or secret information. Examples of popular web proxies are Squid, CCProxy, Apache Traffic Server, and WinGate.

An example of a Squid web proxy log in the Squid-native format appears below. Explanations of the field values appear in the table below the log entry.

DNS Proxy Log Example

1265939281.764     19478 172.16.167.228 TCP_MISS/200 864 GEThttp://www.example.com//images/home.png - NONE/- image/png

Proxy Log Value	Explanation
1265939281.764	Time -in Unix epoch timestamp format with milliseconds
19478	Duration – the elapsed time for the request and response from Squid
172.16.167.228	Client IP address
TCP_MISS/200	Result – Squid result codes and HTTP status code separated by a slash
864	Size – the bytes of data delivered
GET	Request – HTTP request made by the client
http://www.example.com//images/home.png	URI/URL – address of the resource that was requested
–	Client identity -RFC 1413 value for the client that made the request. Not used by default.
NONE/-	Peering code/Peer host – neighbor cache server consulted
image/png	Type – MIME content type from the Content-Type value in the HTTP response header

Note: Open web proxies, which are proxies that are available to any internet user, can be used to obfuscate threat actor IP addresses. Open proxy addresses may be used in blacklisting internet traffic.

Cisco Umbrella
Cisco Umbrella, formerly OpenDNS, offers a hosted DNS service that extends the capability of DNS to include security enhancements. Rather than organizations hosting and maintaining blacklisting, phishing protection, and other DNS-related security, Cisco Umbrella provides these protections in its own DNS service.

Cisco Umbrella is able to apply many more resources to managing DNS than most organizations can afford. Cisco Umbrella functions in part as a DNS super proxy in this regard. The Cisco Umbrella suite of security products applies real-time threat intelligence to managing DNS access and the security of DNS records.

DNS access logs are available from Cisco Umbrella for the subscribed enterprise. Instead of using local or ISP DNS servers, an organization can choose to subscribe to Cisco Umbrella for DNS and other security services. An example of a DNS proxy log appears below. The table explains the meaning of the fields in the log entry.

DNS Proxy Log Example

"2015-01-16 17:48:41","ActiveDirectoryUserName",
"ActiveDirectoryUserName,ADSite,Network",
"10.10.1.100","24.123.132.133","Allowed","1 (A)",
"NOERROR","domain-visited.com.",
"Chat,Photo Sharing,Social Networking,Allow List"

Field	Example	Explanation
Timestamp	2015-01-16 17:48:41	This is when this request was made in UTC. This is different than the Umbrella dashboard, which converts the time to your specified time zone.
Policy Identity	ActiveDirectoryUserName	The first identity that matched the request.
Identities	ActiveDirectoryUserName,ADSite,Network	All identities associated with this request.
Internal Ip	10.10.1.100	The internal IP address that made the request.
External Ip	24.123.132.133	The external IP address that made the request.
Action	Allowed	Whether the request was allowed or blocked.
QueryType	1 (A)	The type of DNS request that was made.
ResponseCode	NOERROR	The DNS return code for this request.
Domain	domain-visited.com.	This is the domain that was requested.
Categories	Chat, Photo Sharing, Social Networking	The security or content categories that the destination matches.

Next-Generation Firewalls

Next-Generation or NextGen Firewall devices extend network security beyond IP addresses and Layer 4 port numbers to the application layer and beyond. NexGen Firewalls are advanced devices that provided much more functionality than previous generations of network security devices.

One of those functionalities is reporting dashboards with interactive features that allow quick point-and-click reports on very specific information without the need for SIEM or other event correlators.

Cisco’s line of NextGen Firewall devices (NGFW) use Firepower Services to consolidate multiple security layers into a single platform.

This helps to contain costs and simplify management. Firepower services include application visibility and control, Firepower Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS), reputation and category-based URL filtering, and Advanced Malware Protection (AMP). Firepower devices allow monitoring network security through a web-enabled GUI called Event Viewer.
Common NGFW events include:

Connection Event – Connection logs contain data about sessions that are detected directly by the NGIPS. Connection events include basic connection properties such as timestamps, source and destination IP addresses, and metadata about why the connection was logged, such as which access control rule logged the event.

Intrusion Event – The system examines the packets that traverse the network for malicious activity that could affect the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of a host and its data. When the system identifies a possible intrusion, it generates an intrusion event, which is a record of the date, time, type of exploit, and contextual information about the source of the attack and its target.
Host or Endpoint Event – When a host appears on the network it can be detected by the system and details of the device hardware, IP address, and the last known presence on the network can be logged.
Network Discovery Event – Network discovery events represent changes that have been detected in the monitored network. These changes are logged in response to network discovery policies that specify the kinds of data to be collected, the network segments to be monitored, and the hardware interfaces of the device that should be used for event collection.
Netflow Event -Network discovery can use a number of mechanisms, one of which is to use exported NetFlow flow records to generate new events for hosts and servers.

Fact Check Policy

Use Of Security Onion As A Source Of Alerts

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Use Of Security Onion As A Source Of Alerts

Security Onion is an open-source suite of Network Security Monitoring (NSM) tools that run on an Ubuntu Linux distribution. Security Onion tools provide three core functions for the cybersecurity analyst: full packet capture and data types, network-based and host-based intrusion detection systems, and alert analyst tools.

Security Onion can be installed as a standalone installation or as a sensor and server platform. Some components of Security Onion are owned and maintained by corporations, such as Cisco and Riverbend Technologies, but are made available as open-source.

For more information, and to obtain Security Onion, search the internet for the Security Onion website.
Note: In some resources, you may see Security Onion abbreviated as SO. In this course, we will use Security Onion.

Detection Tools for Collecting Alert Data

Security Onion contains many components. It is an integrated environment that is designed to simplify the deployment of a comprehensive NSM solution. The figure illustrates a simplified view of the way in which some of the components of the Security Onion work together.

A Security Onion Architecture

This is a web application that allows viewing of pcap transcripts rendered with the tcpflow or Zeek tools. CapME can be accessed from the Enterprise Log Search and Archive (ELSA) tool. CapME provides the cybersecurity analyst with an easy-to-read means of viewing an entire Layer 4 session. CapME acts as a plugin to ELSA and provides access to relevant pcap files that can be opened in Wireshark.

Analysis Tools

Security Onion integrates these various types of data and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs into a single platform through the following tools:

Sguil – This provides a high-level console for investigating security alerts from a wide variety of sources. Sguil serves as a starting point in the investigation of security alerts. A wide variety of data sources are available to the cybersecurity analyst by pivoting directly from Sguil to other tools.
Kibana – Kibana is an interactive dashboard interface to Elasticsearch data. It allows querying of NSM data and provides flexible visualizations of that data. It provides data exploration and machine learning data analysis features. It is possible to pivot from Sguil directly into Kibana to see contextualized displays based on the source and destination IP addresses that are associated with an alert. Search the internet and visit the elastic.co website to learn more about the many features of Kibana.
Wireshark – This is a packet capture application that is integrated into the Security Onion suite. It can be opened directly from other tools and will display full packet captures relevant to the analysis.
Zeek – This is a network traffic analyzer that serves as a security monitor. Zeek inspects all traffic on a network segment and enables in-depth analysis of that data. Pivoting from Sguil into Zeek provides access to very accurate transaction logs, file content, and customized output.

Note: Other Security Onion tools that are not shown in the figure are beyond the scope of this course. A full description of the Security Onion and its components can be found on the Security Onion website.

[embedyt] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sw6BjTBwrqY[/embedyt]

Alert Generation

Security alerts are notification messages that are generated by NSM tools, systems, and security devices. Alerts can come in many forms depending on the source. For example, Syslog provides support for severity ratings which can be used to alert cybersecurity analysts regarding events that require attention.

In Security Onion, Sguil provides a console that integrates alerts from multiple sources into a timestamped queue. A cybersecurity analyst can work through the security queue investigating, classifying, escalating, or retiring alerts. Instead of using a dedicated workflow management system such as Request Tracker for Incident Response (RTIR), a cybersecurity analyst would use the output of an application like Sguil to orchestrate an NSM investigation.

Alerts will generally include five-tuples information when available, as well as timestamps and information identifying which device or system generated the alert. Recall that the five tuples include the following information for tracking a conversation between a source and destination application:

SrcIP – the source IP address for the event.
SPort – the source (local) Layer 4 port for the event.
DstIP – the destination IP for the event.
DPort – the destination Layer 4 port for the event.
Pr – the IP protocol number for the event.

Additional information could be whether a permit or deny decision was applied to the traffic, some captured data from the packet payload, or a hash value for a downloaded file, or any of a variety of data.

The figure shows the Sguil application window with the queue of alerts that are waiting to be investigated in the top portion of the interface.

Sguil Window

The fields available for the real-time events are as follows:

ST – This is the status of the event. RT means real-time. The event is colour-coded by priority. The priorities are based on the category of the alert. There are four priority levels: very low, low, medium, and high. The colours range from light yellow to red as the priority increases.
CNT – This is the count for the number of times this event has been detected for the same source and destination IP address. The system has determined that this set of events is correlated. Rather than reporting each in a potentially long series of correlated events in this window, the event is listed once with the number of times it has been detected in this column. High numbers here can represent a security problem or the need for tuning of the event signatures to limit the number of potentially spurious events that are being reported.
Sensor – This is the agent reporting the event. The available sensors and their identifying numbers can be found in the Agent Status tab of the pane which appears below the events window on the left. These numbers are also used in the Alert ID column. From the Agent Status pane, we can see that OSSEC, pcap, and Snort sensors are reporting to Sguil. In addition, we can see the default hostnames for these sensors, which includes the monitoring interface. Note that each monitoring interface has both pcap and Snort data associated with it.
Alert ID – This two-part number represents the sensor that has reported the problem and the event number for that sensor. We can see from the figure that the largest number of events that are displayed are from the OSSEC sensor (1). The OSSEC sensor has reported eight sets of correlated events. Of these events, 232 have been reported with event ID 1.24.
Date/Time – This is the timestamp for the event. In the case of correlated events, it is the timestamp for the first event.
Event Message – This is the identifying text for the event. This is configured in the rule that triggered the alert. The associated rule can be viewed in the right-hand pane, just above the packet data. To display the rule, the Show Rule checkbox must be selected.

Depending on the security technology, alerts can be generated based on rules, signatures, anomalies, or behaviours. No matter how they are generated, the conditions that trigger an alert must be predefined in some manner.

Rules and Alerts

Alerts can come from a number of sources:

NIDS – Snort, Zeek, and Suricata
HIDS – OSSEC, Wazuh
Asset management and monitoring – Passive Asset Detection System (PADS)
HTTP, DNS, and TCP transactions – Recorded by Zeek and pcaps
Syslog messages – Multiple sources

The information found in the alerts that are displayed in Sguil will differ in message format because they come from different sources.
The Sguil alert in the figure was triggered by a rule that was configured in Snort. It is important for the cybersecurity analyst to be able to interpret what triggered the alert so that the alert can be investigated. For this reason, the cybersecurity analyst should understand the components of Snort rules, which are a major source of alerts in Security Onion.

Sguil Alert and the Associated Rule

Snort Rule Structure

Snort rules consist of two sections, as shown in the figure: the rule header and the rule options. The rule header contains the action, protocol, source and destination IP addresses and netmasks, and the source and destination port information. The rule options section contains alert messages and information on which parts of the packet should be inspected to determine if the rule action should be taken. Rule Location is sometimes added by Sguil.

Rule Location is the path to the file that contains the rule and the line number at which the rule appears so that it can be found and modified, or eliminated if required.

Snort Rule Structure and Sguil-supplied Information

Component	Example (shortened…)	Explanation
rule header	alert ip any any -> any any	Contains the action to be taken, source and destination addresses and port, and the direction of traffic flow
rule options	(msg:”GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE ID CHECK RETURNED ROOT”;…)	Includes the message to be displayed, details of packet content, alert type, source ID, and additional details, such as a reference for the rule or vulnerability
rule location	/nsm/server_data/securityonion/rules/…	Added by Sguil to indicate the location of the rule in the Security Onion file structure and in the specified rule file

The Rule Header
The rule header contains the action, protocol, addressing, and port information, as shown in the figure. In addition, the direction of flow that triggered the alert is indicated. The structure of the header portion is consistent with Snort alert rules.
Snort can be configured to use variables to represent internal and external IP addresses.

These variables, $HOME_NET and $EXTERNAL_NET appear in the Snort rules. They simplify the creation of rules by eliminating the need to specify specific addresses and masks for every rule. The values for these variables are configured in the snort.conf file. Snort also allows individual IP addresses, blocks of addresses, or lists of either to be specified in rules. Ranges of ports can be specified by separating the upper and lower values of the range with a colon. Other operators are also available.

Snort Rule Header Structure

Component	Explanation
alert	the action to be taken is to issue an alert, other actions are log and pass
ip	the protocol
any any	the specified source is any IP address and any Layer 4 port
->	the direction of flow is from the source to the destination
any any	the specified destination is any IP address and any Layer 4 port

The Rule Options
The structure of the options section of the rule is variable. It is the portion of the rule that is enclosed in parenthesis, as shown in the figure. It contains the text message that identifies the alert. It also contains metadata about the alert, such as a URL that provides reference information for the alert.

Other information can be included, such as the type of rule and a unique numeric identifier for the rule and the rule revision. In addition, features of the packet payload may be specified in the options. The Snort users manual, which can be found on the internet, provides details about rules and how to create them.

Snort rule messages may include the source of the rule. Three common sources for Snort rules are:

GPL – Older Snort rules that were created by Sourcefire and distributed under a GPLv2. The GPL ruleset is not Cisco Talos certified. It includes Snort SIDs 3464 and below. The GPL ruleset is can be downloaded from the Snort website, and it is included in Security Onion.
ET – Snort rules from Emerging Threats. Emerging Threats is a collection point for Snort rules from multiple sources. ET rules are open source under a BSD license. The ET ruleset contains rules from multiple categories. A set of ET rules is included with Security Onion. Emerging Threats is a division of Proofpoint, Inc.
VRT – These rules are immediately available to subscribers and are released to registered users 30 days after they were created, with some limitations. They are now created and maintained by Cisco Talos.

Rules can be downloaded automatically from Snort.org using the PulledPork rule management utility that is included with Security Onion.
Alerts that are not generated by Snort rules are identified by the OSSEC or PADS tags, among others. In addition, custom local rules can be created.

Snort Rules Options Structure

Component	Explanation
msg:	Text that describes the alert.
content:	Refers to content of the packet. In this case, an alert will be sent if the literal text “uid=0(root)” appears anywhere in the packet data. Values specifying the location of the text in the data payload can be provided.
reference:	This is not shown in the figure. It is often a link to a URL that provides more information on the rule. In this case, the sid is hyperlinked to the source of the rule on the internet.
classtype:	A category for the attack. Snort includes a set of default categories that have one of four priority values.
sid:	A unique numeric identifier for the rule.
rev:	The revision of the rule that is represented by the sid.

Lab – Snort and Firewall Rules

Different security appliances and software perform different functions and record different events. As a consequence, the alerts that are generated by different appliances and software will also vary.
In this lab, to get familiar with firewall rules and IDS signatures you will:

Perform live monitoring of IDS and events.
Configure your own customized firewall rule to stop internal hosts from contacting a malware-hosting server.
Craft a malicious packet and launch it against an internal target.
Create a customized IDS rule to detect the customized attack and issue an alert based on it.